As a doctrine under question, the effects of lifting the corporate veil can be far-reaching if supported through case law; and yet it appears that the judiciary are reluctant to apply it unless under extreme circumstances and even then with some trepidation, as the primary function of ‘lifting’ or ‘piercing’ the veil of corporations is one of transparency.
No stranger to the world of enterprise, many an entrepreneur has undoubtedly found themselves at odds with where the boundaries are with conversion of assets, or even fiduciary duties in line with corporate ownership.
When matters reach a level that requires legal intervention, the venturing of the courts into financial accounts and expenditure records, is something that rests uneasily on the shoulders of judges.
It is not uncommon after all for businessmen and investors to construct fake companies to provide cover for illegal dealings, no more than shareholders to dominate the actions of their corporations under the guise of boardroom decision making.
Paradoxically, it is precisely this subterfuge that beckons court intrusion, and yet for reasons that can be appreciated in their overall meaning, it does not bode well for the victims of those immoral undertakings when the rule of law refuses to fully extend.
Starting at the roots of this clearly under utilised principle, it is important to understand that supply always creates demand, and so examination of how this doctrine has flourished reveals that the limited liability of incorporation almost invites abuse, regardless of the stakes in hand.
Dating back to 1897, Salomon v Salomon is considered the birthplace of limited liability, as during the liquidation of a failed business, the shareholder and company were held as separate entities, and therefore unencumbered by obligation to one another.
This perhaps dangerous distinction, served well the rule of law, but consequently opened the way to defendants establishing unaccountability for the deviances behind insolvency, or the withholding of property release during matrimonial disputes, as was seen in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd and Others, where despite having grounds to ‘pierce’, the judges went instead with beneficial interest accrued through powers conferred under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973; although since Prest is now considered the leading authority on the protection or exposure of corporate misdeeds, it might pay to look at overseas opinion.
Despite taking a similar vein in most U.S. courts, the small State of Delaware has become reputed as the home for around sixty-five percent of the Fortune 500 companies and the reasons are clear.
Aside from most other county-wide laws shared between States, there appears to be consolidated support for the protection of the corporate veil, under the strongly held belief that without it, the wheels of commerce simply cannot turn.
The notable Cornell Glasgow LLC. v. Nichols is now considered the poster boy for the prevention of access to corporate transactions in middle America, however when examined, there appears no justifiable reason to pierce the corporate veil despite such clandestine and unprofessional behaviours on the part of the defendants; rather the whole matter appears tantamount to little more than a classic breach of contract.
This over complication of the argument begs the question of whether claimants are all too quick to attack the character of the accused in order to alleviate doubts as to a right of claim, whereas proper evaluation of the facts would likely reveal a swift path to justice with reduced costs and minimal court time.
In Canada, the controversial Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje has become the watermark for corporate exposure, coming close to setting a precedent for foreign enquiry into asset liability and covert misdeeds after the indigenous peoples of Ecuador were subject to extreme pollution through the actions of an overseas corporate subsidiary.
While pursuing them through the Canadian courts and almost becoming a pivotal argument for the extension of ‘piercing’ qualification, it was ultimately overturned in the Superior Court by Justice Hainey, who explained that:
“Chevron Canadaʼs shares and assets are not exigible and available for execution and seizure by the plaintiffs in satisfaction of the Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron Corporation.”Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje
This overruling stance (amongst other cases) also fell back on the domestic line taken in Adams v Cape Industries Plc, where it had been decided that:
“Our law, for better or worse, recognises the creation of subsidiary companies, which though in one sense the creatures of their parent companies, will nevertheless under the general law fall to be treated as separate legal entities with all the rights and liabilities which would normally attach to separate legal entities.”Adams v Cape Industries Plc
While this principle poses great resistance to those seeking damages, the primary reason the courts declined to lift the corporate veil in Chevron was simply that since the inception of the claim, no suggestions of fraudulent behaviour were levelled toward the defendants.
This translated that no matter how aggrieved the claimants felt, it was held inequitable to overstep the boundaries set by the incorporation and limited liabilities enjoyed by many firms in order to achieve remedy for damages arising from contractual breach on the part of the actual offending party Texaco; who were taken over by Chevron California (the parent company), soon after acquiescing to the judgment bought against them in Ecuador.
In fact, quite why the claimants were pursuing Chevron Canada is frankly unfathomable given the background to the matter, therefore it comes as no great surprise that the ruling to ‘pierce’ was quickly dismissed.
To summarise, it would suggest that on the strength of the cases discussed here, it is not really an issue of judicial reluctance as much as a failure for the right matter to present itself.
It would also pay to exercise caution when supporting foreign claims displaying absolutely no logical bearing on how this confused claim should ever have been initiated and why any jurisdiction would move to lend credence to such a fruitless endeavour; while from an equitable perspective, the principle of traceability immediately springs to mind when seeking restitution from companies no longer in existence; and whose assets have long since been laundered.