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The phrase ‘two wrongs do not make a right’ is virtuous to the truth that misdeeds can never amount to anything more than loss, yet when adopted for equitable purposes, the exact opposite can be found.
After rising through the ranks of Hong Kong administration, a solicitor turned Director of Public Prosecutions positioned himself whereby he was able to accept sporadic bribes in exchange for his obstruction of justice through the failed convictions of known criminals. Having taken over HK $12m in payments, the respondent in this matter invested the funds into three properties, two of which were in title to himself and his wife and the third to his solicitor.
The discovery of his fraudulent behaviour and subsequent criminal prosecution, raised the question of whether by his breach of fiduciary duty as a servant of the Crown, the sums paid were now held upon constructive trust for his former employers, and that any monetary gain following the purchase of the homes was composite to that trust.
Common law principles surrounding fiduciary breach and profit from such breaches have been long held to apply in favour of the trust beneficiary, despite the illegality on the part of the fiduciary when in receipt of bribes from third parties. This is because when acting beyond the remit of the trustee, and in a manner that is dishonest, the action itself becomes legitimate, if only for the benefit of those the fiduciary/trustee was appointed to serve.
This translates that although the respondent allowed himself to selfishly receive bribes in exchange for personal profit, equity would ascribe that his deceit was immediately converted into a positive gesture conferring direct gain to his employers, as no fiduciary can be seen to profit from his breach as previously mentioned. This, by virtue of the fact of those principles, altered the manner in which the respondent not only executed his plans, but provided the Crown with privilege to acquire beneficial interest in the properties purchased, along with any increase their value since initial conveyance.
When considered by the Privy Council, it was quickly agreed that any conditions imputed by the respondents upon the entitlement of his employers to seek recovery of the debts through the homes, failed to override the fundamental obligations owed to him while serving and acting under fiduciary capacity, despite any notion of separateness or mixed investment on his part.
“A fiduciary is not always accountable for a secret benefit but he is undoubtedly accountable for a secret benefit which consists of a bribe. In addition a person who provides the bribe and the fiduciary who accepts the bribe may each be guilty of a criminal offence. In the present case the first respondent was clearly guilty of a criminal offence.”
“[I]t is unconscionable for a fiduciary to obtain and retain a benefit in breach of duty. The provider of a bribe cannot recover it because he committed a criminal offence when he paid the bribe. The false fiduciary who received the bribe in breach of duty must pay and account for the bribe to the person to whom that duty was owed.”
“Equity considers as done that which ought to have been done. As soon as the bribe was received, whether in cash or in kind, the false fiduciary held the bribe on a constructive trust for the person injured.”
“[T]here is no reason why equity should not provide two remedies, so long as they do not result in double recovery. If the property representing the bribe exceeds the original bribe in value, the fiduciary cannot retain the benefit of the increase in value which he obtained solely as a result of his breach of duty.”
“Property acquired by a trustee as a result of a criminal breach of trust and the property from time to time representing the same must also belong in equity to his cestui que trust and not to the trustee whether he is solvent or insolvent.”
“[P]roperty which a trustee obtains by use of knowledge acquired as trustee becomes trust property. The rule must, a fortiori, apply to a bribe accepted by a trustee for a guilty criminal purpose which injures the cestui que trust.”
“If in law a trustee, who in breach of trust invests trust moneys in his own name, holds the investment as trust property, it is difficult to see why a trustee who in breach of trust receives and invests a bribe in his own name does not hold those investments also as trust property.”
“[A] fiduciary acting dishonestly and criminally who accepts a bribe and thereby causes loss and damage to his principal must also be a constructive trustee and must not be allowed by any means to make any profit from his wrongdoing.”