Implication by way of contract, is argued in a case involving the conflict of interests between two tenants and a perhaps disorganised and rushed grant of occupancy by the landlord.
In a time immediately before the Law of Property Act 1925, a landowner sought to let out a part of his estate for a determined period, while under the terms of the lease, there was at the time, a gravelled road that passed by the tenant’s rented property named ‘The Gardens’, which led to the door of the main estate property named ‘The Hall’.
At the time the tenant began his residence, there was also an unfinished bridleway that allowed for access to the rear of the Gardens, albeit given no mention within the contract, nor any reliable evidence that use of the drive had been orally agreed between the two parties.
During this period, and shortly after taking occupancy of the Gardens, the Hall was leased to another occupier, with no issues arising between them.
A few years afterwards, this same tenant vacated the Hall; and so, the landowner let it out to another party for a fixed period; after which, the occupier of the Gardens continued to use the gravelled drive as a means of access to the front of his property, as he had since his lease began.
Two years after taking up residency, the defendant in this case erected a wire fence to prevent the claimant and tenant of the Gardens from using the gravelled drive as a means of access; hence, the need for litigation.
Relying upon the wording of section 62(1) of the 1925 Act, and the fact that there had never been any other suitable means of access to his home, the claimant argued that an easement by way of implication had been granted by the landlord.
When considered by the court, the facts determined that there was a clear difference between the granting of a lease and the conveyance of interest in land or property; and that in this instance, the former applied.
There was however, the principle that under the terms of the contract there could be argued, an obligation to undertake full performance of the rights bestowed the claimant, where unless the contract provides specific exclusion of a right of way between two sharing tenants, the gravelled drive afforded both users equal powers to enforce their rights.
It was on these grounds, that the judge endorsed the action and awarded accordingly, while holding that:
“[A] grantor of property, in circumstances where an obvious, i.e., visible and made road is necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the property by the grantee, must be taken prima facie to have intended to grant a right to use it.”