Performance of a contract since frustrated through unexpected events, lies at the heart of a matter between a landlord and potential tenant, who having secured a room for the purposes of viewing a landmark event, was left unable to realise it when those plans were thwarted through a sudden cancellation.
In 1902, the appellant had negotiated the private use of a room within a property owned by the respondent, who for reasons of convenience, had recently offered the whole property for rent for a six-month period. Having been aware that the King’s Coronation procession was expected to pass along the Pall Mall, the appellant read that the respondent was offering a single room for a fixed time and sum to those wishing to take advantage of the view afforded. By means of letter, the two parties agreed upon the arrangement, after which the appellant paid by cheque, a sum of 25l with a further 50l outstanding.
Unfortunately, the date of the procession was put back, at which point the appellant refused to pay the outstanding 50l, thereby prompting the respondent to seek recovery of the balance owed, while the appellant counter-claimed for the 25l on grounds that the contract was unenforceable and the deposit due for return.
In the fist hearing, the court awarded in favour of the respondent on both counts, relying upon the principle that the contact rested upon the presence of the Coronation procession, which for the reasons stated had not occurred, and so therefore the contract was unable to be completed to the satisfaction of both parties.
Taken to the Court of Appeal, the facts were revisited, along with the earlier facts of Taylor v Caldwell, in which it was remarked:
“[W]here, from the nature of the contract, it appears that the parties must from the beginning have known that it could not be fulfilled unless, when the time for the fulfilment of the contract arrived, some particular specified thing continued to exist, so that when entering into the contract they must have contemplated such continued existence as the foundation of what was to be done; there, in the absence of any express or implied warranty that the thing shall exist, the contract is not to be considered a positive contract, but as subject to an implied condition that the parties shall be excused in case, before breach, performance becomes impossible from the perishing of the thing without default of the contractor.”
It was this approach that gave effect to the cancellation of the Coronation procession as being an event that was, as stated in Baily v De Crespigny:
“[O]f such a character that it cannot reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the contracting parties when the contract was made, and that they are not to be held bound by general words which, though large enough to include, were not used with reference to the possibility of the particular contingency which afterwards happened.”
While in ‘Taylor on Evidence’ (vol II) it was also stressed that:
“It may be laid down as a broad and distinct rule of law that extrinsic evidence of every material fact which will enable the Court to ascertain the nature and qualities of the subject-matter of the instrument, or, in other words, to identify the persons and things to which the instrument refers, must of necessity be received.”
So it was for these fundamental reasons that the Court agreed with the previous decision, and ruled again in favour of the respondent, while reminding the court that:
“[W]hatever is the suggested implication – be it condition, as in this case, or warranty or representation – one must, in judging whether the implication ought to be made, look not only at the words of the contract, but also at the surrounding facts and the knowledge of the parties of those facts.”