Inducement of consideration on the part of a promisee to a contract, whether written or oral, is an action that while not seemingly of benefit to the promisor, requires completion of the gesture by lawful means should natural justice be seen to be done.
In 1926, the appellant inherited a substantial amount of land from one of her sons, after which she aimed to use it to make amends for her late husband’s death, whose own will had disinherited four of his children, while the remaining four became beneficiaries to portions of his estate.
By way of reparation, the appellant sought the counsel of a number of those children, while on a number of occasions, explaining that she intended for the respondent to relocate from his home in Logan County, to a plot estimated at around 80-97 acres in size.
This became problematic for the respondent, as he was indebted by way of mortgage and could not just ‘up sticks’ and move; at which point, the appellant took steps to reassign the mortgage to herself to allow the respondent to take up residence on the land set aside for him.
This was duly executed until around a year later, when the respondent was served with a notice to quit by one of his brothers, whereupon he sought remedy by way of a conveyance from the appellant to support his right to title.
Given that the appellant was illiterate, it became apparent that she had not taken the steps needed to complete such a disposition, but had instead relied upon her own insistence that she would bequeath him the land by way of a will, which was yet to be drafted.
When heard at the district court, the judge ruled in favour of the respondent, whereupon the appellant contested it within the Supreme Court of Kansas. Here, reference was made to s.32 of the Restatement Law of Contracts which reads:
“In case of doubt an offer is interpreted as inviting the offeree to accept either by promising to perform what the offer requests or by rendering the performance, as the offeree chooses.”
While s.90 of the same document reads:
“A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance, is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”
Which translated that despite a failure to endorse her intentions through written expression, the appellant had by virtue of her repeated declarations, created an enforceable contract of disposition that by extension, had led to the relocation of the respondent on the pretence that title was both implied and ultimately due through either deed or testamentary powers.
It was this irreversible fact that led the Court to uphold the previous decision and dismiss the appeal outright on grounds that financial remedy would not be sufficient to the cause in hand, while reminding the parties that:
“A promise for breach of which the law gives a remedy, or recognizes as creating a legal duty, is a contract. The promise need not be in any crystallized form of words: “I promise,” “I agree,” etc. Ritual scrupulousness is not required and, generally, any manifestation, by words or conduct or both, which the promisee is justified in understanding as an expression of intention to make a promise, is sufficient.”