Gulf Oil Corporation v Gilbert

US Civil Procedure

Gulf Oil Corporation v Gilbert
Image: ‘Leyland Octopus Gulf Oil’ by Mike Jeffries

Choice of venue within a civil action, while enjoyed by claimants for honourable reasons, can sometimes prove destructive to the roots of a claim when the right is abused or exercised in error. In this instance, the want of policy ran risk of disrupting and possibly destroying, the need for redress through the use of established legal doctrine.

In 1944, the appellants supplied a delivery of gasoline to the respondent in Lynchburg, Virginia, whereupon an explosion caused significant damage to the establishment, customers property and pecuniary standing of the proprietor. Upon litigation, the respondent sought damages of around $365,000, and when exercising his civil rights, elected to issue proceedings in the state of New York, as explained under under title 28, ch.87 s.1391(b) of the US Code, which reads:

“A civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.”

And yet with appreciation that the appellants were based in New York, the court elected to challenge the choice of venue on grounds of ‘forum non conveniens’, which translated that although the claimant had a right to choose the venue best suited to their needs, the location of the actual event, the relevant evidence, potential expedience, lower legal costs and optimal attendance of both jurors and witnesses, demonstrated that the hearing was best heard in Virginia, as opposed to a courtroom almost four-hundred miles away.

Taken to the District Appeal Court, the decision was reversed back in favour of the claimant, whereupon the matter was further escalated to the US Supreme Court under writ of certiorari. Here, it was noted that it was not unusual for claimants to abuse s.1391 by choosing inconvenient forums as a means of vexing and oppressing the defendant, thereby reducing the opportunity of a fair trial, while it also became apparent that on this occasion, the lawyer acting under instruction for the claimant resided in New York, and was retained by the insurance firm for reasons benefiting their own interests, hence arguing strongly in favour of one venue over the other, despite the obvious inconvenience to the claimant.

In light of this glaring disparity, the Court held that there were simply too many reasons for a trial to be held in Virginia, and that despite any contention that the District Court had acted ultra vires, the judgment of the Appeal Court was too narrow an interpretation of the doctrine, and so the decision was reversed with a view to proceedings in Lynchburg.

Key Citations

“[T]he doctrine of forum non conveniens can never apply if there is absence of jurisdiction or mistake of venue.”

Harris v Balk

US Civil Procedure

Harris v Balk
Image: ‘Strong Arm’ by Kevin LePrince

Debt priority through attachment is not something familiar to English law, however in America the facts are quite different, and in this instance the indebtedness of a lender became primary to the borrower’s failure to repay, after a third party attached the sum outstanding through applicable state law.

In 1896, two men residing in North Carolina entered into a verbal agreement concerning the lending of $180, during which time the lender and now claimant, had an outstanding debt of $344 with a lender in Maryland. While visiting Baltimore, the now defendant was approached by the Maryland lender, who issued a writ of attachment for $180 under the powers of ss.8 and 10 of art.IX of the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland, both of which read:

“8. Upon making the affidavit and producing the proofs before the clerk of the court from which such attachment is to issue…he shall issue an attachment against the lands, tenements, goods, chattels and credits of said debtor.

10. Any kind of property or credits belonging to the defendant, in the plaintiff’s own hands, or in the hands of any one else, may be attached; and credits may be attached which shall not then be due.”

Having failed to attend the hearing, the defendant admitted later acquiesced to the attachment and entered payment for the sum owed to the Maryland claimant in accordance with both the statute and decision of the court.

Upon this, the claimant sought remedy on grounds that the Maryland court lacked sufficient jurisdiction to apply such an attachment, whereupon the defendant claimed under art.IV of the Constitution that:

“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”

Therefore the judgment against the defendant to the claimant’s creditor was equally valid in North Carolina as it was in Maryland. However, the supreme court of North Carolina awarded in favour of the claimant on grounds that the defendant was in Maryland for but a brief time, and that the debt was initiated and so grounded in North Carolina.

Heard before the US Supreme Court, it was explained through Chicago, R. I. & P. Co. v. Sturm that:

“All debts are payable everywhere unless there be some special limitation or provision in respect to the payment; the rule being that debts, as such, have no locus or situs, but accompany the creditor everywhere, and authorize a demand upon the debtor everywhere.”

While s.35 of art.IX of the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland provides that:

“Any judgment of condemnation against a garnishee ad execution thereon, or payment by such garnishee, shall be sufficient and pleadable in bar in any action brought against him by the defendant in the attachment for or concerning the property or credits so condemned…”

Which translated that the claimant had equal opportunity to sue the defendant for his debt while in Maryland, but failed to do so, while it was also held that upon litigation, the defendant was under a legal duty to notify the claimant that a third party had issued an attachment for the $180, whereupon the claimant is afforded opportunity to defend the debt, as had been held in Morgan v. Neville. This caveat left the Court with no option other than to reverse the previous decision for further discussion, so as to avoid duplication of a debt recently paid in full.

Key Citations

“Power over the person of the garnishee confers jurisdiction on the courts of the state where the writ issues…”

“The obligation of the debtor to pay his debt clings to and accompanies him wherever he goes. He is as much bound to pay his debt in a foreign state when therein sued upon his obligation by his creditor, as he was in the state where the debt was contracted.”

“It is nothing but the obligation to pay which is garnished or attached. This obligation can be enforced by the courts of the foreign state after personal service of process therein, just as well as by the courts of the domicile of the debtor.”

“[I]f such creditor himself had the right to commence suit to recover the debt in the foreign state, his representative has the same right, as representing him, and may garnish or attach the debt, provided the municipal law of the state where the attachment was sued out permits it.”

Adam v Saenger

US Civil Procedure

Adams v Saenger
Image: ‘Texas Longhorn Skull’ by Marlon Rose

When parties to an existing litigation require an immediate defence response, the essence of the Constitution reminds those involved, that regardless of how such matters are realised, the purpose of natural law is to permit resolution in every state.

On this occasion, a Texas-based exporter and importer commenced action against a former California-based client for the recovery of monies concerning goods purchased and delivered prior to their dissolution. In response, the appellant issued a cross-complaint to recover monies for the conversion of chattels, after which the superior court of California dismissed the respondents claims, along with their contention that the cross-complaint had not been lawfully served, thus prompting an appeal to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals. Here, it was held that at the time the complaint was served, the California court lacked jurisdiction to uphold such a claim over an out-of-state entity, therefore due process was unsustainable and null by effect.

Pursued in the US Supreme Court, the decision of the Texas Appeals Court was reviewed, giving particular regard to s.1 of art IV of the Constitution, which reads:

“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”

And while the complaint served was ancillary to the original action, the Texas Court of Appeals based its judgment on the principle that any matter of fact or law determinable by jurisdiction unrelated to the cause of litigation is subject to adjudication, as was held in Thompson v Whitman, and that the complaint was deemed independent of the original matter, and therefore subject to such a review.

However in Hanley v Donoghue, it had been equally held by the US Supreme Court that:

“Whatever was matter of law in the court appealed from is matter of law here, and whatever was matter of fact in the court appealed from is matter of fact here.”

More importantly, s.442 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides that:

“Whenever the defendant seeks affirmative relief against any party, relating to or depending upon the contract, transaction, matter, happening or accident upon which the action is brought, or affecting the property to which the action relates, he may, in addition to his answer, file at the same time, or by permission of the court subsequently, a cross-complaint.”

While s.1015 (as amended by St.Cal.1933) also notes:

“When a plaintiff or a defendant, who has appeared, resides out of the State, and has no attorney in the action or proceeding, the service may be made on the clerk or on the justice where there is no clerk, for him. But in all cases where a party has an attorney in the action or proceeding, the service of papers, when required, must be upon the attorney instead of the party…”

Therefore when the appellant issued his complaint to the attending attorney, both aspects of Californian law were satisfied enough to uphold the powers of art.IV of the Constitution, and that such diligence by the appellant lawyer was now grounds enough for the Court to reverse the Texas Appeal Courts decision with a view to the resolution of the proceedings in question.

Key Citations

“There is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent a state from adopting a procedure by which a judgment in personam may be rendered in a cross-action against a plaintiff in its courts, upon service of process or of appropriate pleading upon his attorney of record.”

Aldinger v Howard

US Civil Procedure

Aldinger v Howard
Image: ‘Spokane Skyline’ by Pablo Romero

Litigation for loss of earnings through discriminatory dismissal is a linear process within state jurisdiction, however when the employer is a federal representative, the rules according to civil suits are subject to close examination.

Having enjoyed work as a cleric within the Spokane County Treasury, the claimant was dismissed under s.36.16.070 of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW), which grants that:

“The officer appointing a deputy or other employee shall be responsible for the acts of his or her appointees upon his or her official bond and may revoke each appointment at pleasure.”

Under a claim in the District Court, the now appellant argued that dismissal merely for living with her boyfriend was a violation of the First, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and that under the circumstances, the Treasury was equally liable under 42 USC § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 1871, which provides that:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress…”

It was for these reasons that an injunction was requested against the appointing officer and his wife, while the county was deemed subject to vicarious liability through the misconduct of the two named employees, both of which claims were brought under the powers of 28 USC § 1343(3), which explains that the district courts are required:

“(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States…”

When first heard, the court held that Spokane County could not be held liable as a ‘person’ and therefore no suit could be brought against them, after which the appellant sought relief through the Court of Appeals, who with reference to 28 USC § 1343(3), upheld the previous decision, however when taken to the US Supreme Court, greater detail was paid to the doctrine of both ‘pendent’ and ‘ancillary’ jurisdiction, upon which the ruling in Mine Workers v Gibbs determined how the former provided that:

“[S]tate and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff’s claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is Power in federal courts to hear the whole.”

While the latter was outlined in Fulton Bank v Hozier, when it was held how:

“The general rule is that when a federal court has properly acquired jurisdiction over a cause, it may entertain, by intervention, dependent or ancillary controversies; but no controversy can be regarded as dependent or ancillary unless it has direct relation to property or assets actually or constructively drawn into the court’s possession or control by the principal suit.”

However, on this occasion both approaches ran counter to the principle held in the Appeals Court that:

“[F]ederal courts should be wary of extending court-created doctrines of jurisdiction to reach parties who are expressly excluded by Congress from liability, and hence federal jurisdiction…”

This translated that while Art.III of the Constitution allowed the Supreme Court to vest adjudicatory powers to the lower courts, the conflicting principles of both 42 USC § 1983 and that of the Appeals Court prevented the Court from allowing a mergence of the two claims, despite their obvious connectivity, and which resulted in dismissal of the appeal despite a majority dissent.

Key Citations

“[A]s against a plaintiff’s claim of additional power over a “pendent party,” the reach of the statute conferring jurisdiction should be construed in light of the scope of the cause of action as to which federal judicial power has been extended by Congress.”