Within law there are many types of legal injunctions across a number of different fields and their purpose is one of prevention or denial of an action or that of proximity to a party or place. In contract law there are mandatory (or negative) and prohibitory injunctions while in civil litigation there are interim (also found in criminal law), anti-suit and freezing injunctions. Within family law there are non-molestation and occupation injunctions (or orders) whereas under tort a claimant can apply for either partial or temporary injunctive relief as well as interim and super-injunctions (depending on the circumstances). In Equity and trust law there are also perpetual (or final) injunctions along with quia timet injunctions.
Often sought after the fact the purpose of this injunction is to force by application the party that has undertaken an act causing sufferance to the clamant, a liability to reverse the damage done through new action. There are however degrees of limitation to its use as under certain conditions, the extent of work required to restore the balance may outweigh the priority of the claimant seeking redress.
An example of this is Charrington v Simons & Co Ltd where after selling a portion of his land the buyer breached the restrictive covenant by resurfacing an adjoining road despite inherited limitations as to its operational height. When the applying the injunction the previous judge set conditions upon its use that allowed the respondent to effectively trespass on his land when restoring the road to its intended level; a decision that caused further angst toward the appellant and that was overturned to ironically set the injunction back into its proper effect. This was explained by Russell LJ who explained:
“…the judge, in adopting the course which he did, travelled beyond the bounds within which discretion may be judicially exercised; for in effect he sought to force upon a reluctant plaintiff something very like a settlement involving operations by the defendant on the plaintiff’s land which must lead to greatly increased harm to his business as a condition or term of his obtaining a mandatory injunction should the works not prove a satisfactory solution.”
While compelling in their purpose, prohibitory injunctions serve to prevent through inaction and are often used to control the events that either surround a contractual relationship or follow when the arrangement is dissolved. Typical scenarios range from former employees being forbidden to occupy similar positions within a particular radius or from using their skills to benefit another in a competing field through to sportsmen unable to play for specific rival teams for a determined period. The caveat within these restrictions is one of a right to live and so any prohibitory injunction granted must not deny those relevant the opportunity to work and live inclusive to the terms afforded others in a similar position.
An example of this is Jaggard v Sawyer in which damages in lieu were awarded to avoid the imposition of an injunction after completion of a second property upon land that contained restrictive covenants designed to deny such acts. While the defendants argued that attempts were made to explain their intentions and that due care was shown during the building process the appellants refused to accept damages and moved instead to enforce an injunction that by now was pointless and highly oppressive to the owners and potential tenants of the new house. This point was made clear by Sir Thomas Bingham MR who noted:
“It was suggested that an injunction restraining trespass on the plaintiffs roadway would not be oppressive since the occupiers of No. 5A could use the other half of the roadway outside the plaintiffs house, but this would seem to me unworkable in practice, a recipe for endless dispute and a remedy which would yield nothing of value to the plaintiff.”
Found in at least three areas of law these are often used to deny certain actions for a specific period, most often missed pre-trial in order to preserve order while the parties prepare themselves for the hearing without interruption. That said it is important that those seeking one are able to rely upon a substantive cause of action as was explained by Lord Diplock in The Siskina when he said:
“A right to obtain an [interim] injunction is not a case of action. It cannot stand on its own. It is dependent upon there being a pre-existing cause of action against the defendant arising out of an invasion, actual or threatened by him, of a legal or equitable right of the [claimant] for the enforcement of which the defendant is amenable to the jurisdiction of the court. The right to obtain an [interim] injunction is merely ancillary and incidental to the pre-existing cause of action.”
It is also not uncommon for the High Courts to issue interim injunctions when criminal matters call and this position was made clear when in Attorney-General v Chaudry Lord Denning MR expounded:
“There are many statutes which provide penalties for breach of them; penalties which are enforceable by means of a fine or even imprisonment but this has never stood in the way of the High Court gaining an injunction. Many a time people have found it profitable to pay a fine and go on breaking the law. In all such cases the High Court has been ready to grant an injunction…”
Within tort there is legislative security offered through the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 which explains within s.3 that those seeking relief can apply for injunctions carrying criminal sanctions for non-compliance; as has been seen in celebrity and media related cases including AM v News Group Newspapers Ltd where an emergency interim injunction was ordered against a number of leading newspapers after their photographers descended upon the home of a landlord that inadvertently let one of his properties out to a suspected terrorist; an act that then attracted unwanted and stressful press attention around the claimant’s private residence. The grounds for this restriction were outlined by Tugendhat J who commented:
“Measures to ensure that respect is given to person’s home and family and family are required by ECHR Art 8 and Human Rights Act 1998 s.6. In so far as the order that I make prohibits disclosure of information, it is with a view to preventing interference with that right by intrusion or harassment, not preventing disclosure of information which is sensitive for any other reason.”
Also known as a Mareva Injunction this order is issued in relation to assets involved in a civil claim. The injunction will typically apply only to the value argued and it prevents access by one party that might otherwise seek to remove or sell them for profit. While used to secure their presence during pre-trial and proceedings, the order cannot override the effects of liquidation and those seeking claim may find themselves denied of success when judgment is made. An example of the strict criteria surrounding freezing injunctions (particularly without notice) was expressed by Neuberger J in Thane Investments Ltd v Tomlinson (No1) where he remarked:
“… the duty of a person seeking an order, and in particular an order which can have as substantial an effect as a freezing order, in the absence of the Defendant against whom it is sought, is strict and important. An order against a person in his absence, particularly when it is a freezing order, which is a very serious infringement of his rights and liberties, can only be justified on appropriately clear and strong facts and risks. It should only be granted in circumstances which provide maximum protection for the person against whom the order is to be made. The courts have frequently emphasised the importance of compliance with the various requirements of the Rules relating to the obtaining of without notice orders.”
Designed to provide victim protection within intimate or blood-related relationships this injunction can be sought by the party involved, or under s.60 of the Family Law Act 1996 where a third party can seek the courts issue if those suffering are too afraid to request it. The purpose of this order is in the name inasmuch as denial of physical access when used to molest, harass or threaten the claimant to the point of legal intervention through verbal abuse and unwarranted use of that persons private property. The importance of this order was outlined by Wall J in G v F (Non-Molestation Order: Jurisdiction) where after the original court failed to grant protection to a single mother it was overturned and expeditiously supported through the words:
“Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996 is designed to provide swift and accessible protective remedies to persons of both sexes who are the victims of domestic violence, provided they fall within the criteria laid down by section 62. It would, I think, be most unfortunate if section 62(3) was narrowly construed so as to exclude borderline cases where swift and effective protection for the victims of domestic violence is required.”
Sometimes issued in conjunction with a non-molestation injunction, the occupation injunction confers power upon the court to prevent those in question from occupying a property. This can be used in both domestic abuse cases and also civil disputes surrounding property ownership or residency. As this injunction runs risk of serious restriction to individual rights the circumstances surrounding its use must be fully evaluated to avoid counter claims by the affected party. This strict yet delicate approach was underlined by Lady Justice Black in Dolan v Corby where she stressed:
“…it must be recognised that an order requiring a respondent to vacate the family home and overriding his property rights is a grave or draconian order and one which would only be justified in exceptional circumstances, but exceptional circumstances can take many forms and are not confined to violent behaviour on the part of the respondent or the threat of violence and the important thing is for the judge to identify and weigh up all the relevant features of the case whatever their nature.”
Falling under the umbrella of interim injunctions a super injunction reveals greater yet highly focussed powers when preventing actions of third parties. Typically used to deny publication of potentially damaging material this order can be issued without notice and not only denies public access but anonymises the applicants identities, making it an effective tool for public figures and corporate entities alike. The validity of this injunction was well explained by The Master of the Rolls in JIH v News Group Newspapers Ltd where it was outlined:
“…the claimant’s case as to why there is a need for restraints on publication of aspects of the proceedings themselves which can normally be published is simple and cogent. If the media could publish the name of the claimant and the substance of the information which he is seeking to exclude from the public domain (i.e. what would normally be information of absolutely central significance in any story about the case who is seeking what), then the whole purpose of the injunction would be undermined, and the claimant’s private life may be unlawfully exposed.”
Perpetual (or final) injunctions
Unlike interim injunctions these orders are issued at point of judgement and therefore remain in effect for an unlimited period. An example of this is Law Society v Kordowski in which a website designed to allow members of the public free expression of their disdain following direct experience with named solicitors was challenged upon numerous litigious grounds. This case was one of a number of individual matters and when moving to award final and indefinite removal of the site and future publications, Tugendhat J iterated that such injunctions were imperative when:
“The procedural remedy of representative proceedings, coupled with an injunction, may be the best that the law can offer at present to protect the public from the unjustifiable dissemination of false information about the suppliers of goods and services. It is also the means by which the court may protect its limited resources in time and judiciary from having to deal with large numbers of claims by different claimants against the same individual on the same or similar facts.”
Quia Timet injunctions
In much the same as mandatory injunctions serve to ‘undo’ the damage done, quia timet injunctions are anticipatory in that their purpose is the prevention of potential future harm that while proactive in design, relies upon compelling evidence to provoke court dispensation. The importance of overwhelming argument was made clear by Lord Dunedin in Attorney-General for Canada v Ritchie Contracting & Supply Co Ltd when he outlined:
“Any restraint upon that at the instance of the other party must consist of an injunction of the quia timet order. But no one can obtain a quia timet order by merely saying ” Timeo ” ; he must aver and prove that what is going on is calculated to infringe his rights.”
In closing it must be noted that this is by no means an exhaustive list of injunctions; however it is hopefully detailed enough to provide a sound knowledge base when an understanding of their differences and relevance within case law is a priority. It may also pay to consider that in many instances there will always be degrees of overlap as nothing in life is ever straightforward and it is only through the investigative efforts of the judges that the attributable criteria can emerge.