Collins v Wilcock (1984)

English Criminal Law

Collins v Wilcock
‘Parisian Life’ by Juan Luna

Most likely uncertain to many members of the general public, the difference between assault and battery are markedly different, as was established in a case involving a uniformed policewoman and a suspected prostitute, judged to be loitering for the purposes of unlawful solicitation.

In the summer of 1982, the now respondent was driving in her patrol car when herself and her colleague observed what appeared to be two prostitutes standing around in the street whilst conversing with two men for what was determined to be a negotiation of solicitation, upon which the respondent requested that the now appellant enter the car so they could question her, to which the appellant lawfully refused and proceeded to walk away.

It was at this point that the respondent left the vehicle and attempted to question the appellant again while in pursuit, to which the appellant told her unceremoniously to ‘fuck off’, a statement that caused the respondent to physically grab the appellant by the forearm so as to restrain her from walking further, and which in turn resulted in the appellant shouting again ‘just fuck off copper’ and scratching the respondent’s forearm with her fingernails; an action that led to the appellant’s arrest and subsequent charge of assaulting a police officer in the line of duty.

Having contended the offence before the then Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate presiding in the Marylebone office, London, the appellant argued that the respondent was at the time of her physical exertion, acting beyond the scope of her police powers, while the respondent countered that she had acted lawfully under the Street Offences Act 1959, in which s. 1(1) which read that:

“It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution.”

And s. 3, which further reads that:

“A constable may arrest without warrant anyone he finds in a street or public place and suspects, with reasonable cause, to be committing an offence under this section.”

To which the magistrate held the appellant guilty of the offence of assault, and fined her £50 under s. 51(1) of the Police Act 1964 while holding that:

“[I]n the circumstances the placing of her hand on [the defendant’s] arm to restrain her from moving away, yet again, was within her duty and was not unreasonable.”

A decision which the appellant challenged in the High Court, holding as before that the respondent had acted unlawfully when attempting to deny the appellant her freedom to leave when questioned.

Here, the court first looked to Cole v Turner, in which the Court of the Kings Bench had held that:

“The least touching of another is battery.”

Which was a principle later expanded upon in William Blackstone’s ‘Commentaries on the Laws of England’ (1830), in which it was stated clearly that:

“[T]he law cannot draw the line between different degrees of violence, and therefore totally prohibits the first and lowest stage of it; every man’s person being scared, and no other having a right to meddle with it, in any the slightest manner.”

And so noting that assault is an act that causes another person to ‘apprehend the infliction of immediate unlawful force’ upon them, battery requires the ‘actual infliction of unlawful force’, and so on this occasion the court held that when attempting to restrain the appellant, the respondent had acted outside her official powers when there had in that instance, been no grounds for any arrest, but instead the subjective compulsion to prevent the appellant from exercising her civil rights through the use of battery, thus the appeal was upheld, while the court held that:

“[E]verybody is protected not only against physical injury but against any form of physical molestation” 

And that: 

“[R]easonable force may be used in self-defence or for the prevention of crime.”

Trespass

Insight | August 2017

Trespass
‘No Trespassing’ by Arthur Wardle

For clarification, there are two types of trespass, namely trespass to the person and trespass to land. As with anything requiring individual expansion, we will begin by looking at trespass to the person.

Trespass to the person
Trespass to the person includes three torts, ranging from (i) battery (ii) assault and (iii) false imprisonment, as first truly defined by Goff LJ in Collins v Warlock when he said:

“An assault is an act which causes another person to apprehend the infliction of immediate, unlawful, force on his person; a battery is the actual infliction of unlawful force on another person. Both assault and battery are forms of trespass to the person. Another form of trespass to the person is false imprisonment, which is the unlawful imposition of constraint upon another’s freedom of movement from a particular place.”

(i) Battery
While claiming accidental causes, the defendant in Williams v Humphrey was found liable for battery after pushing the victim into a swimming pool, whereupon the claimant broke his ankle. Given that the intention to push the victim was present, no argument to the contrary could reasonably stand and so damages were awarded.

(ii) Assault
In R v Ireland, a number of women subjected to continuous psychological damage through repeated abusive phone calls, were given the right to claim for assault, even though they never met the defendant in person. When reaching summary judgment, it was remarked by Hope LJ that:

“If the words or gestures are accompanied in their turn by gestures or by words which threaten immediate and unlawful violence, that will be sufficient for an assault. The words or gestures must be seen in their whole context.”

(iii) False Imprisonment
While reminiscent of physical imposition, this tortious facet involves the restriction of liberty and movement of an individual. As many might expect, there are cases where over extension of a prison sentence will suffice, however mere isolation or deprivation of escape will also apply. It is important to note that while the victim may only fear these actions yet not necessarily fall subject to their physical consequences, psychological harm, where proven, will suffice under a claim. Unlike the tort of negligence, trespass to the person relies upon intention, actual harm and obvious effect, and so victims are compensated not for unintentional damage, but that caused with deliberation.

Trespass to land
Similarly, trespass to land addresses deliberate actions by those subject to it, while primary focus is placed upon the protection and preservation of land or property. Harm is treated as one stemming from interference with a right to privacy and occupation, and so while possession of the land is imperative to a successful claim, there are, as with trespass to the person, four distinct categories of interference, namely (i) crossing a boundary, (i) remaining on land, (iii) exceeding permissions associated with land and (iv) placing objects upon land without express consent of the owner.

(i) Crossing boundaries
Undoubtedly the more common complaint is one of boundary violation, and while often focussed upon overgrown foliage or other such matters, there are also incidents where property intrudes into the airspace of land, such as in Anchor Brewhouse Developments Ltd v Berkley House (Dockland Developments) Ltd where a contractor’s crane overswung into a neighbouring property, thus prompting a supported claim for trespass through ‘airspace’.

(ii) Remaining on land
In Jones v Persons Unknown, the freeholders of unregistered land were forced to serve eviction notices after a group of ‘fracking’ protestors set up residence and refused to leave. While claiming to be protecting the land on which they had become entrenched, the defendants were ultimately evicted under the award of a possession order on grounds of trespass. When outlying the justification for the order, the judge remarked:

“[T]here is simply no evidence that they gave any relevant consent to the occupation of their land which would preclude the claimants from seeking to recover it back…he was in unlawful possession of the claimants’ land, and thus amenable to a claim in trespass and the costs associated with such a claim. It would be to allow him, and others in a similar position, effectively to get away with acts of trespass if they were not required to pay the costs of consequent legal proceedings.”

(iii) Exceeding permissions (trespass ab initio)
When a party enters owned land under agreement, but then proceeds to potentially outstay that welcome through unlawful or abusive actions, the owner is entitled to claim trespass from the point at which the visitor caused offence. In a case called The Six Carpenters, a number of carpenters entered an inn before ordering and paying for wine and bread; however things took a turn for the worse when after ordering more wine they refused to pay for it; thus instigating a unsuccessful claim for trespass damages by the landlord when the court held:

“[F]or not paying for the wine, the defendants shall not be trespassers, for the denying to pay for it is no trespass, and therefore they cannot be trespassers ab initio…”

(iv) Placing objects
In Arthur v Anker, the deliberate placement of an oil tanker and flower pots along a boundary wall caused tensions between neighbours, until a claim for trespass led to an injunction to remove the objects, despite several months between their placement and the litigation. In surmising the judgment, Aldous J emphasised that:

“[T]here is no evidence that such inaction in respect of the oil tank, or any inaction in respect of the flower pots, caused Mr. Stones to believe that he could maintain the tank on the wall situated as it is…He placed the tank upon the wall himself and in my view it could not be seriously suggested that there was detriment in not objecting immediately and now requiring him to remove it.”