Mayes v. People (1883)

US Criminal Law

Mayes
‘Still Life Beer’ by Neil Carroll

Death resulting from a reckless act is on most occasions deemed manslaughter, however with overwhelming evidence of wilful intent, the court cannot simply accept anything less than a charge of murder, as was explained in this case between the convicting State and the subjective argument of a clearly mentally distressed man.

The nature of this 1883 matter rests upon the testimony of both a grandmother and the defendant in error’s young daughter, who at the time of the offence witnessed their father return home from a nearby saloon in a drunken state, while obviously angry for reasons left unknown to the court.

Having entered the family home around 9pm, the defendant in error proceeded to request arsenic while explaining that either himself or the deceased needed to die, upon which the deceased made a number of strategic attempts to placate his temper and settle his mind.

After his refusing to eat food or engage with those around him, the defendant in error later sat alone and continued to make demands upon his wife and daughter, until for no sound reason he threw a tin of food at his daughter, who ran for safety as the deceased quickly followed with a gas lamp in hand, at which point the defendant in error forcefully threw a heavy beer glass at his wife, and upon which the glass struck the lamp and caused the ignited oil to spill all over her clothing.

Seemingly unwilling to assist the deceased, the defendant in error watched as she was engulfed in flames and suffered five major burns to her head, neck, legs and body, all of which led to her death some five days later, and so indicted in the Circuit Court of Jersey County the jury convicted the defendant in error of murder, whereupon he appealed the decision under writ of error in the Illinois Supreme Court.

Here the court first referred to § 140 of the Illinois Revised Statutes, which read that:

“Malice shall be implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.” 

And then to Francis Wharton’s ‘A Treatise on the Law of Homicide in the United States’, in which p. 45 read that:  

“When an action, unlawful in itself, is done with deliberation, and with intention of mischief or great bodily harm to particulars, or of mischief indiscriminately, fall where it may, and death ensue, against or beside the original intention of the party, it will be murder.”

While the defendant in error continued to explain that he was simply attempting to dispose of the glass through an open rear door, a statement which was reasoned away by the two witnesses, who confirmed that the door was in fact closed at all times that evening. 

Thus with no reason to accept the alcohol-hazed recollection of a man claiming to have felt no ill-will toward the deceased, the court instead noted that had there been no aggression behind the act then the verdict would have likely been in doubt, however it was patently clear that harm was intended when assessing the impact of the glass upon the lamp, and so with little hesitation the court upheld the previous judgment while reminding those present that:

“Malice is an indispensable element to the crime of murder.” 

The tort law section is now finished!

United States Law: A Case Study Collection

Tort Law
‘Anger’ by Alla Dzevaltovska

After working on this final chapter of the book for the past few months, I’m very pleased to announce that it is now finally complete, which has left me feeling a mixture of emotions, particularly as this wonderful and frankly unprecedented project has been the primary focus of my energy since November 2017.

As I have always done with the previous disciplines shown in the forthcoming ‘United States Law’, the final listing is here for you to view, and so I can only hope that you enjoy reading about them as much as I have studying and preparing them for publication.

1. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila

2. Anderson v. St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co.

3. Beul v. ASSE International Inc.

4. BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore

5. Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development

6. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.

7. Borsheim v. Great Northern Railway Co.

8. Brown v. Kendall

9. Burton v. Cowell Publishing Co.

10. Christensen v. Superior Court

11. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn

12. Dillon v. Legg

13. Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co.

14. Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders Inc.

15. Earles v. Perkins

16. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno

17. Falcon v. Memorial Hospital

18. Foster v. Preston Mill Co.

19. Garratt v. Dailey

20. Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc.

21. Goldberg v. Florida Power & Light Co.

22. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc.

23. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc.

24. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi

25. Jacque v. Steenburg Homes Inc.

26. Katko v. Briney

27. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp.

28. Knight v Jewett

29. MacPherson v Buick Motor Co.

30. Marshall v. Nugent

31. Martin v. Herzog

32. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley

33. Mohr v. Williams

34. Nash v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

35. New York Times Company v. Sullivan

36. Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.

37. Philip Morris USA v. Williams

38. Ploof v. Putnam

39. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey v. Arcadian Corp.

40. Riss v. City of New York

41. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint

42. Rowland v. Christian

43. Scribner v. Summer

44. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories

45. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain

46. Soule v. General Motors Corp.

47. Strauss v. Belle Realty Co.

48. Summers v. Tice

49. Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California

50. Tedla v. Ellman

51. The Florida Star v. B.J.F.

52. Time Inc. v. Hill

53. Tunkl v. Regents of University of California

54. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche

55. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.

56. Vosburg v. Putney

57. Ybarra v. Spangard

58. Zeran v. America Online Inc.

R v Adomako (1994)

English Criminal Law

R v Adomako
‘The First Operation with Ether’ by Robert Cutler Hinckley

The difference between criminal negligence and manslaughter is discussed in a case that showcased the immense vulnerability with which we place our care, and therefore our lives, in the hands of medical professionals on any given day.

Having been summoned to serve as a locum anaesthetist at Mayday Hospital, London, during a routine eye operation, the appellant was alerted by an alarm on the Dinamap machine, whereupon he immediately administered two intravenous doses of atropine on the assumption that the patient was having what he thought was an ocular cardia reflex, even though the actual cause of the alarm had resulted from a disconnection of the endotracheal tube providing oxygen to the patient, some four and a half minutes earlier.

In fact, it wasn’t until the appellant noticed how the patient had begun to turn blue, that he attempted to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), which proved ultimately futile when the patient then suffered a cardiac arrest and died, all of which resulted in the appellant appearing before the Central Criminal Court on charges of manslaughter, wherein the jury found him guilty.

Having challenged the judgment in the Court of Appeals, the appellant argued that while a failure to notice the disconnection was short of the duty of care prescribed him, his actions following his discovery were reasonable given the circumstances, and that the court ought to have found him culpable only of misdiagnosis and not criminal negligence, or even manslaughter as convicted.

However with consideration of the proportional trial direction, the court explained that when attempting to determine involuntary manslaughter, a jury must first establish (i) the existence of a duty, (ii) a breach of that duty that amounts to a death, and (iii) negligence sufficient enough to warrant a criminal conviction, and so having deliberated upon the facts presented, the court held that:

“It was in our view clearly open to the jury to conclude that the appellant’s failure to perform his essential and in effect sole duty to see that his patient was breathing satisfactorily and to cope with the breathing emergency which should have been obvious to him, justified a verdict of guilty. They were entitled to conclude his failure was more than mere inadvertence and constituted gross negligence of the degree necessary for manslaughter.”

Whereupon the appellant’s case was presented to the House of Lords on the question as to whether in cases of manslaughter the jury ought to be guided by the test first used in R v Lawrence and now commonly applied in motor vehicle related deaths, or by those principles used in the trial court.

Here the House first turned to R v Bateman, in which the Court of Appeal had held that:

“[I]n order to establish criminal liability the facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury, the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the state and conduct deserving punishment.”

 While the House noted that in Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions it had similarly held that:

“Simple lack of care such as will constitute civil liability is not enough: for purposes of the criminal law there are degrees of negligence: and a very high degree of negligence is required to be proved before the felony is established.”

However in Lawrence the test for recklessness was reliant upon the fact:

(i) “[T]hat the defendant was in fact driving the vehicle in such a manner as to create an obvious and serious risk of causing physical injury to some other person who might happen to be using the road or of doing substantial damage to property…”

And:

(ii) “[T]hat in driving in that manner the defendant did so without having given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or, having recognised that there was some risk involved, had nonetheless gone on to take it.”

Thus the House held that when ascertaining liability for manslaughter, the courts ought only to rely upon the  Bateman and Andrews tests in order to simplify their application and assist a jury, although should the judge feel so compelled, he might also consider the Lawrence test where wholly applicable, upon which the court dismissed the appeal in full, while holding that:

“To make it obligatory on trial judges to give directions in law which are so elaborate that the ordinary member of the jury will have great difficulty in following them, and even greater difficulty in retaining them in his memory for the purpose of application in the jury room, is no service to the cause of justice.” 

 

R v Haigh (2010)

English Criminal Law

R v Haigh
‘Woman with Dead Child’ by Käthe Kollwitz

As is peculiar to criminal law in most jurisdictions, the necessary component for murder requires evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of the both the act itself (actus reus), and the subjective intention (mens rea) of those accused, and so on this occasion the English criminal courts were left with no option other than to reduce a murder sentence to manslaughter, on grounds that there was simply insufficient evidence to adduce deliberate and unlawful killing, as opposed to what could only be construed as a momentary loss of control on the part of the defendant.

Having been born to unloving and thus dysfunctional parents, the appellant had been later adopted by a well educated and devoted couple when aged only eight years of age, and whose only wish was for her to have a better life than the one she had left behind. Sadly during her adolescence, the appellant was further diagnosed with an IQ of just 74, a personality disorder, attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and prolonged depression, for which she was on prescribed medication.

After meeting her former partner at the young age of sixteen, the appellant soon became pregnant, and gave birth to their son Billy two years later, and although the two of them remained together for a further three years, her partner was eventually incarcerated for assaulting her; an act which had followed years of his routine verbal and physical abuse towards her both before, and after, their son’s arrival.

At the point of her indictment before the Central Criminal Court, the appellant was reported to have called the ambulance services complaining that her son had stopped breathing, and yet despite clear instructions to perform emergency cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) at the time of the call, her son was pronounced dead almost five hours later; after which it was claimed by court that the appellant had murdered her son by way of asphyxiation, and that there was sufficient medical evidence upon which to sustain the conviction; whereupon the appellant challenged the verdict in the Court of Appeals.

Here, the appellant contended that when reaching summary judgment, the trial court had erroneously accepted circumstantial evidence relating to previous interactions with her son, and which presented her in a poor light, however the court referred to R v Penman, in which the deciding court had held that:

“[W]here it is necessary to place before the jury evidence of part of a continual background of history relevant to the offence charged in the indictment and without the totality of which the account placed before the jury would be incomplete or incomprehensible, then the fact that the whole account involves including evidence establishing the commission of an offence with which the accused is not charged is not of itself a ground for excluding the evidence.”

Thus the first aspect of her appeal was denied, while on a second count, the appellant claimed that lack of witness testimony, and only one physical symptom of trauma, prevented the court from establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that she had intended to murder, or at the very least unlawfully kill her son in the moments before his death.

Here the court was reliant upon the presence of petechial haemorrhaging upon her child’s face, which in most instances was attributable to asphyxial death. However, there was also theoretical argument that prolonged resuscitation could also prove a contributory factor; yet further circumstantial evidence proposed this as incredible, based upon the appellant’s refusal to perform CPR whilst waiting for the ambulance crew to arrive, and via witness testimony citing visible evidence of the symptoms upon their arrival.

In addition to this, there was further evidence of bleeding from the child’s ears, which according to expert medical testimony, had often been found present when addressing traumatic asphyxiation cases in which young children had become trapped in washing lines, a  fact which only exacerbated the suggestion that the appellant had either strangled or smothered her son whilst alone with him, therefore the court held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to determine that the appellant had unlawfully killed her child.

This left only the third count, which was that a murder conviction was unsafe due to the first two factors, and that there was simply no direct evidence to support the contention that the appellant had wilfully and with malice, killed her child, but that instead, the best the court could hope to rely upon was a manslaughter charge; an argument that caused the court to uphold the third ground of appeal before quashing the murder conviction on grounds that in R v Stacey it had held that:

“[A]n intent to do serious bodily harm may be quickly formed and soon regretted; but so may a less serious intent, simply to stop a child crying by handling him in a way that any responsible adult would realise would cause serious damage or certainly might do so. That would only provide the mental element necessary for manslaughter.”

In re Baden’s Deed Trusts (No.2) (1972)

English Equity & Trusts

Baden's Deed Trusts
‘Il Quarto Stato’ by Guiseppe Pellizza da Volpedo

In what was to become an overly protracted and yet hotly debated case, the question of trust instrument validity and the limiting scope of trust powers, fell upon the English courts to answer, when what appeared at the time was judicial wisdom, later proved a confused doctrine that polluted similar cases in the years following its declaration.

Having become the director of a highly successful M&E company first established in 1927, and as a man of inherent providence, the deceased had taken it upon himself to draft a trust deed in 1941, that would allow his current and former employees to benefit from financial gifts on a potentially recurring basis, while in addition to this their immediate relatives were also to enjoy similar windfalls, as was contained in clause 9(a) of the trust, which read that:

“The trustees shall apply the net income of the fund in making at their absolute discretion grants to or for benefit of any of the officers and employees or ex-officers or ex-employees of the company or to any relatives or dependants of any such persons in such amounts at such times and on such conditions (if any) as they think fit and any such grant may at their discretion be made by payment to the beneficiary or to any institution or person to be applied for his or her benefit and in the latter case the trustees shall be under no obligation to see the application of the money…”

However upon his death in 1960, the appointed executors notified the trustees that the trust was void for uncertainty, as it would be almost impossible to distinguish one employee from another, never mind any relatives known to exist at the time of his passing, which was a position adopted in light of the company’s growth from 110 to 1,300 employees during the preceding years.

Commencing by way of an originating summons in 1967, the trustees argued that clause 9(a) merely represented a power to distribute funds to a class of beneficiaries, while the executors held that the use of the word ‘shall’ created instead, a mandatory trust that once unable to be fully executed, would nullify itself and thus fall within the residual estate.

In the first instance, the Court of Chancery examined the construction of the deed, and found that due to discretionary nature of clause 9(a), the trust conferred a power upon the trustees, and not an immutable instruction that once unfulfilled, rendered the trust void for uncertainty; a statement upon which the executors challenged the findings in the Court of Appeal.

Here, the court referred to In re Gestetner Settlement, in which Harman J had held that when ascertaining the exactness of a trust deed beneficiary class:

“[T]he trustees must worry their heads to survey the world from China to Peru…”

Which was to suggest an immense undertaking for trustees, unless it could be proven that the deed conferred a mere power, in which case, reasonable certainty of the beneficiary class ought then be shown. In light of this precedent, the court subsequently held that as before, the context of clause 9(a) was such that the trustees were afforded discretionary powers, and so held that:

“[C]lause 9 of the deed may properly be construed as the judge did, by holding that it creates a power and not a trust…”

At which point the executors along with the deceased’s widow, pursued their argument before the House of Lords on grounds that clause 9(a) represented a mandatory trust, and that as such, the ruling in the recent Inland Revenue Commissioners v Broadway Cottages directed the decision of the court when it held that:

“[A] trust for such members of a given class of objects as the trustees shall select is void for uncertainty, unless the whole range of objects eligible for selection is ascertained or capable of ascertainment…”

Which it was argued, was now impossible due to the vast number of both former and existing employees, causal employees and extended family members; a contention that left the House allowing the appeal by way of reference back to the Chancery Court for greater clarification, while also holding that in their opinion:

“[T]he trust is valid if it can be said with certainty that any given individual is or is not a member of the class.”

Once again in 1972, the court reviewed the position on the wording, and thereby meaning of trusts and powers, along with the validity of the trust in relation to s.164 of the Law of Property Act 1925, which stipulated that:

“1. No person may by any instrument or otherwise settle or dispose of any property in such manner that the income thereof shall…be wholly or partially accumulated for any longer period than one of the following…(a)the life of the grantor or settlor; or (b) a term of twenty one years from the death of the grantor, settlor or testator…” 

And so with a thoughtful, albeit exhaustible, examination of the deed, the court held that a discretionary trust did exist, and that despite the 31 years since its execution, such an instrument was valid when called into purpose, which echoed the sentiment of the House when the court further held that the trust was valid on the principle that there were sufficient company records to show, and thereby establish, who was reasonably eligible for the benefit of the funds when distributed by the trustees, upon which the executors challenged the judgment before the Court of Appeal one final time.

Here, the executors argued that unless an individual could not be proven as falling outside the scope of the trust, the trust must fail, while the court reasoned that while operating within the bounds of practicality, the trustees had shown that they were equipped to trace staff records back to the inception of the company, and thereby allocate the majority of employees and their immediate relatives, whereupon the court conclusively dismissed the appeal, while simply holding that:

“[A] trust for selection will not fail simply because the whole range of objects cannot be ascertained.”

Burrough v Philcox (1840)

English Succession Law

Burrough v Wilcox
‘The Writing Of The Will’ by Christian Ludwig Bokelmann

The intention to bequeath when drafting a well organised and thoroughly considered will remains the deciding authority of the testator, and so when perhaps vital elements to that redistribution are left wanting, the power falls to the court to compel the wishes of the deceased in as full a manner as possible, as was found in this potentially convoluted suit.

Having given tremendous thought to the lifetime of his estate, and the unavoidable dilemma of untimely deaths, the deceased had made express stipulations as to the execution of his legacy should his immediate  progeny die, while this caveat was made clear by the words:

“[I]n case my son and daughter should both of them die without leaving lawful issue, then for the said estates to be disposed of as shall be hereinafter mentioned (that is to say), the longest liver of my two children shall have power, by a will, properly attested, in writing, to dispose of all my real and personal estates amongst my nephews and nieces or their children, either all to one of them, or to as many of them as my surviving child shall think proper.”

And so in the sad event that his two children were unable to live long enough to bear children, or oversee the disposition of his estate as he had wished, the matter was presented to the Court of Chancery, so as to establish if when dying, the power to assign to those in vivo was relinquished, or if the estate was to remain in trust for the benefit of those now dead.

After much deliberation, and a reinvestigation of a number of arguable precedents, the court turned to Brown v Higgs, in which it was held that within circumstances where those granted executory powers have passed, the will itself becomes a mere trust, and therefore:

“[T]he trustee having died without executing it, or transgressing it, or refusing to execute it, shall not prevent its being held an absolute benefit for the objects, with a power to give a preference.”

Thus the court held that where a will or codicil is deliberate enough to provide express use of its power, the court is granted proper authority to ensure that its instructions are followed both with judicial impartiality and honest justiciability, therefore the will was enforced and the proper class of beneficiaries shown due privilege, while the court also held that:

“[W]hen there appears a general intention in favour of a class, and a particular intention in favour of individuals of a class to be selected by another person, and the particular intention fails, from that selection not being made, the Court will carry into effect the general intention in favour of the class.”

R v Williams (Barry Anthony) (1991)

English Criminal Law

Williams (Barry Anthony)
‘Glastonbury Mud at Sunset’ by Kurt Jackson

The importance, if not imperative demonstration of causation lies at the heart of a case in which a jury was led to believe that manslaughter by way of robbery was unquestionably evident, when in fact the circumstances behind the event were such that prevented any reasonable direction, or sustainable conviction thereafter.

In June of 1989, the appellant was driving a vehicle with two passengers when a hitch-hiker attempted to obtain a lift to Glastonbury Festival. Having entered the car, the now deceased was subjected to what was held as a pre-meditated robbery attempt, during which he threw himself from the vehicle at speed, an action that resulted in severe head trauma and his subsequent death.

Upon indictment to the Bristol Crown Court, the appellant and the co-defendants were accused of threatening the victim so as to take all of his money, whereupon he had reluctantly offered to pay a nominal sum to the appellant rather than risk suffering possible violence while travelling inside the car.

Despite a lack of causative evidence aside from the witness testimonies of the three men accused, the presiding judge explained to the jury that:

“[W]hat he was frightened of was robbery, that this [money] was going to be taken from him by force, and the measure of the force can be taken from his reaction to it. The prosecution suggest that if he is prepared to get out of a moving car, then it was a very serious threat involving him in the risk of, as he saw it, serious injury.”

And so when reaching a verdict, the jury held that two of the men were guilty of manslaughter, with the appellant found to have been the one threatening the victim shortly before his death, a decision which was challenged in the Court of Appeal on grounds of misdirection and lack of causation between the actual threat and subsequent death.

Here the court turned to R v Roberts, in which the Court of Appeal had held that:

“[I]f of course the victim does something so “daft,” in the words of the appellant in this case, or so unexpected, not that this particular assailant did not actually foresee it but that no reasonable man could be expected to foresee it, then it is only in a very remote and unreal sense a consequence of his assault, it is really occasioned by a voluntary act on the part of the victim which could not reasonably be foreseen and which breaks the chain of causation between the assault and the harm or injury.”

While in R v Mackie, the court had further held that:

“Where the injuries are fatal, the [escape] attempt must be the natural consequence of an unlawful act and that unlawful act ‘must be such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise must subject the other person to, at least, the risk of some harm resulting therefrom, albeit not serious harm’….”

A fact that on this occasion, was far from proven, but instead relied upon the urgency of the judge when directing the jury. This translated that the court was unable to sustain the previous verdict of either count, as neither robbery nor manslaughter had been proven beyond any reasonable doubt, therefore the appeal was allowed in full, while the court held that in matters of manslaughter:

“[T]he nature of the threat is of importance in considering both the foreseeability of harm to the victim from the threat and the question whether the deceased’s conduct was proportionate to the threat….”