U.S. v. Carolene Products Co.

US Constitutional Law

US v Carolene Products Co
Image: ‘Oreo Cookies and Milk’ by Mick McGinty

Amendment rights and the need to protect against fraud, are central to a case involving a distributor of food products and the intervention by Congress in the interests of public safety when in 1938, a corporate entity was indicted under §§ 61 and 62 of the Filled Milk Act 1923.

After having shipped a number of containers of ‘Milnut’, a product that fell within the scope of the Act, and which resulted in a sentence of either imprisonment or a $1000 fine as per § 63, the now appellee was charged with illegal distribution and misrepresentation, within which § 62 clearly expressed how:

“It is declared that filled milk, as herein defined, is an adulterated article of food, injurious to the public health, and its sale constitutes a fraud upon the public. It shall be unlawful for any person to ship or deliver for shipment in interstate or foreign commerce, any filled milk.”

Whereupon the matter was taken to appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court under the Criminal Appeals Act 1907. Here, the appellee demurred that application of the 1923 Act was subject to the limitations prescribed by the tenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states that:

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

And that seizure of the prohibited goods was a breach of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which expresses how:

“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury…nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…”

Therefore the decision by Congress to create and apply prohibitive legislation which conflicts with the aims of the Constitution, was both ultra vires and an affront to the privacy rights and freedoms of the individual citizens of the United States of America.

Contrastingly, the Court drew reference to Hebe Co. v. Shaw, in which the Supreme Court ruled that any state law forbidding the manufacture and sale of filled milk under § 6(c) of the 1923 Act, which clarified how:

“The term ‘filled milk’ means any milk, cream, or skimmed milk, whether or not condensed, evaporated, concentrated, Powdered, dried, or desiccated, to which has been added, or which has been blended or compounded with, any fat or oil other than milk fat, so that the resulting product is in imitation or semblance of milk, cream, or skimmed milk, whether or not condensed, evaporated, concentrated, powdered, dried, or desiccated.”

Was not an infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, which again stipulates that:

“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

This translated that while the rights afforded under the Constitution were exempt from the wishes of Congress, the importance of public interest and compelling evidence submitted by the House Committee on Agriculture and the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry in relation to ‘doctored’ milk, justified the prevention of misrepresentation through sensitive regulation, as opposed to wanton deprivation of liberty or distortion of justice. Thus it was for this fundamental reason that the Court dismissed the demurrer and reversed the judgment accordingly.

Hutto v. Davis

US Criminal Law

Hutto v Davis
Image: ‘Smoke on the Water’ by Barbara St. Jean

Disproportionate sentencing for non-violent offences, while not surprising in a multi-jurisdictional continent, becomes central to the hierarchical fragility of a country built upon fairness and constitutional rights, when a convicted felon receives life imprisonment for drug related offences valued at less than $200 at the time of arrest.

In 1973, Virginia state police raided and recovered nine ounces of marijuana from the home of the defendant, prior to his conviction for possession with intent to distribute. When awarding judgment, the court passed a sentence of forty years imprisonment with a fine of $10,000, after which the defendant successfully appealed under habeas corpus, while contending that such an exorbitant term was in contravention to art.VIII of the US Constitution which reads:

“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”

And s.1 of art.XIV which reads:

“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

Unfortunately, a US court of appeals panel reversed the decision on grounds that at no point in history had the Court been found liable for cruel and unusual punishment when sentencing under the guidance of state legislation, however when reheard in full judicial capacity, the court amended its earlier judgment back in favour of the appellant.

Through the application of Rummel v. Estelle, in which a Texan defendant had been unfairly sentenced to life imprisonment for fraudulent misrepresentation to the value of just under $121, the US Supreme Court ruled that despite the extremity of the sentences, there was nothing unconstitutional about the application of maximum penalty through approved legislative framework, and that on this occasion, when the lower courts had relied upon the four principles used in Hart v. Coiner:

  1. No element of violence and minimal, debatable danger to the person
  2. Examination of the purposes behind criminal statute and alternative mitigating remedies
  3. Evidence of excessive penalty beyond maximum recommendations
  4. Evidence of disproportionate sentencing through comparative state analysis

To allow the appeal, they had collectively failed to recognise that federal courts should be slow to review legislative sentencing mandates, and that tradition clearly showed how such instances were both rare and intrusive to the doctrine that amendments to statute were privy to Congress and not the courts. It was thus for these reasons that the US Supreme Court reversed the findings of the court of appeals, with explicit instruction to dismiss the habeas corpus, despite a majority dissent from within.

R v Lambie

English Criminal Law

 

R v Lambie
Image: ‘Red Purse’ by Vladimir Kush

Fraudulent misrepresentation and the need for proof of inducement, may at first seem like prudent adjudication, however when the facts are properly assembled, there is little doubt as to whether the act itself was one of corroboration through personal gain, or a simple exploitation of the contractual arrangements between credit and debtor.

In the winter of 1980, the now respondent was convicted for obtaining pecuniary advantage by deception under s.16(1) of the Theft Act 1968 after an indictment on two counts, one of which was quashed, while the second occurred during a period after the lending bank had recalled the credit card used.

Having been granted use of the card in spring 1977, the bank had, after a period of time, requested its return after the respondent had incurred a debt far in excess of the prescribed limit of £200. On 6 December 1977, the respondent agreed to return the card, after which she entered into a transaction in a Mothercare store on 15 December 1977, before returning the card on 19 December, at which point the debt had increased to a princely £1005.

At the trial, the jury returned a verdict against the respondent, after which she appealed on grounds that the store clerk had, by her application of store policy regards their relationship with the bank, allowed the transaction to proceed, not because she had been falsely induced, but rather because the credit card was (i) within the expiration date, (ii) not on the store’s ‘stop list’ and (iii) the respondent’s signature matched that on the card. It was also argued that the mere presentation of the card did not indicate anything more than that of a right to use it, as opposed to any representation on behalf of the bank, therefore liability for deception could not stand.

With doubts as to the exactness of related precedent, the Court of Appeal reluctantly overturned the conviction, during which Cumming-Bruce LJ remarked:

“By their contract with the bank, Mothercare had bought from the bank the right to sell goods to Barclaycard holders without regard to the question whether the customer was complying with the terms of the contract between the customer and the bank.”

At which point the County Chief Constable appealed under s.33(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, and the matter was again presented before the House of Lords. Here, the facts of R v Charles were given deliberate consideration, in particular the commentary by Diplock LJ who had explained:

“By exhibiting to the payee a cheque card containing the undertaking by the bank to honour cheques drawn in compliance with the conditions endorsed on the back, and drawing the cheque accordingly, the drawer represents to the payee that he has actual authority from the bank to make a contract with the payee on the bank’s behalf that it will honour the cheque on presentment for payment.

What creates ostensible authority in a person who purports to enter into a contract as agent for a principal is a representation made to the other party that he has the actual authority of the principal for whom he claims to be acting to enter into the contract on that person’s behalf.

[T]hen, is he bound by the contract purportedly made on his behalf. The whole foundation of liability under the doctrine of ostensible authority is a representation, believed by the person to whom it is made, that the person claiming to contract as agent for a principal has the actual authority of the principal to enter into the contract on his behalf.”

Which meant that despite the protestations of exemption from the transaction, the respondent was inevitably liable for deception when using the card in the knowledge that it was the property of the issuing bank, and that the period for its used had since expired. It was also noted by the House that when introducing the concept of inducement into any act of fraud, the words of Humphrey J in R v Sullivan reminded the judiciary that:

“[I]t is patent that there was only one reason which anybody could suggest for the person alleged to have been defrauded parting with his money, and that is the false pretence, if it was a false pretence.”

At which point the House unanimously reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and awarded due judgment for the Crown.

 

Hasham v Zenab

English Contract Law

Hasham v Zenab
Image: ‘Palace Gate, Udaiper’ by Colin Campbell Cooper

Specific performance and cessation of contract on grounds of mistake, are both viable arguments for either continuation of contractual obligations, or the cessation of a transaction for reasons non-detrimental to both contractees. However, both approaches rely upon the honesty and accountability of at least one party should the courts take a view to upholding either of them.

In this instance, a Gujarati widower entered into an agreement to convey a determinate plot of land for an agreed sum, yet immediately after signing the disposition, she tore up the document and refused to continue with the transaction on grounds that she had been misled as to (i) the size of the plot and (ii) the identity of the individual to whom the purchaser was planning to sell it to.

During initial litigation, her argument for the fraudulent misrepresentation was based upon her limited grasp the English language, and so she had elected a representative to be present with her at the time of signing. However, it was also argued that no mention had been given of the size of the plot, which in the first instance was alleged to be half an acre, and not the two acres contained within the conveyance, a fact discovered only after the signing.

When cross-examined, the respondent was proven to have falsified the statement, and thus her witness was accused of perjury, whereas contrastingly, the appellant contested that during preliminary talks, the proposed plot was described as two acres, and not the half-acre suggested. The contract itself was signed in the presence of a third party, however the respondent also relied upon the contention that at no point during an earlier meeting did anybody translate the contents of the contract, despite the appellant claiming that not only did he explain it, but the respondent’s cousin had also clarified its contents to her. It was likewise argued by the appellant that the respondent tore up contract, not because of the plot variation, but upon the knowledge that the land was to be resold to an individual she had a dislike of; however this was also proven to be untrue after lengthy cross-examination and questioning of oral evidence.

Upon summation, the trial judge awarded in favour of the appellant, despite reservations around the integrity of both parties, and so when presented to the Court of Appeal, the Court took issue with the reliability of the appellant’s statements and proceeded to reexamine the facts before reaching the exact same conclusion as the lower court.

Take finally to the House of Lords, it was noted that vol.2 of ‘Williams on Vendor and Purchaser’ clearly illustrated that:

“[A]s a rule, either party to a contract to sell land is entitled to sue in equity for specific performance of the agreement. This right is, in general, founded on a breach of the contract, but not in the same manner as the right to sue at law. The court has no jurisdiction to award damages at law except in case of a breach of the contract; while the equitable jurisdiction to order an agreement to be specifically performed is not limited to the cases in which at law damages could be recoverable.”

Which translated that when contracting parties hold a good account of themselves throughout their dealings, equity would provide sufficient weight as to instigate specific performance; yet on this occasion, neither party had been anywhere near as truthful as a court would rightfully expect, and so on this principle it was impossible to uphold the appeal, nor enforce the equitable rights of the appellant or those forwarded by the respondent.

Healey v Brown

Succession Law

Healey v Brown
Image: ‘The Pact’ by François Bard

As can often result from mutual wills, the overlapping fields of contract law and equity become central to the resolution of this property dispute, after a claimant intervenes in the immoral acquisition of sole title to the matrimonial home of a son’s parents.

The drafting of mutual individual wills reflected that upon death, the surviving spouse became under law, the sole beneficiary of that person’s equitable and legal interest in the property occupied at the time of death. Where neither party were survivable, the individual wills stated that the wife’s niece was to become the beneficiary of the equally held share of the leasehold, and that the father’s son would inherit the remainder of the estate.

Following the death of the wife, the husband took the liberty of transferring his now sole title to that of a shared (or joint) title to the property with his son; an act that in and of itself, contravened the earlier agreement within their final (and irrevocable by declaration) wills. This transgression had remained unaddressed until the death of the father, preceding a naturally vehement claim by the niece that the transfer of title constituted fraud, and that under those circumstances, the son now held both parents’ share of the property upon trust for her, and that despite any contractual arrangements made between the father and son, the binding nature of the mutual wills superseded any administrative effects constructed under the laws of property.

Despite drawing argument against mutual testation under the property doctrine of survivorship, it remained evident that the father was acting within a fiduciary capacity when surviving his wife’s death, and so by avoiding the duties prescribed him, he breached that obligation in favour of his son’s expectation to benefit.

Again, as with the rules of equity and proscription of contract law, there appeared to be a lack of clarity surrounding the written intentions of the testator and testatrix, while the basis for this opposition relied upon s.2 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, where the disposition of land requires a single co-signed document containing the terms of the arrangement (or at the very least an exchange of those documents) as proof of intention; yet as the mutual wills were never signed by their respective partners, any desire to enforce their bequests became invalid under the Act itself. This essentially meant that:

“No disposition of land can be challenged unless done so with a written and signed document contrary to the one drafted by the person charged.”

Sadly, the nature of the wills were such that neither party co-signed the others wills prior to their deaths, which thereby prevented a contract of sorts to exist, so on this occasion the judges decided that instead of the property now becoming the sole title to the claimant, as was the design of the mutually drafted wills, the home was now held in equal shares for both parties to enjoy, albeit through the framework of a constructive trust.

Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA

European Law

Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA
Image: ‘Barcelona Sunset’ by Anna Maria Edulescu

To read about this case in greater depth, and with the benefit of full OSCOLA referencing, simply purchase a copy of ‘The Case Law Compendium: English & European Law’ from leading booksellers around the world.

Where can I buy it?

The book is available now through most Amazon sites thanks to the brilliance of Print on Demand (POD) technology and it is also printed through Ingram Spark (aka Lightning Source), who, through their worldwide  partnership agreements, supply ‘The Case Law Compendium’ to almost 40,000 retailers, libraries, schools and universities while providing worldwide shipping as standard.

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I cannot emphasise enough just how invaluable this book will become to you as your law course progresses, and you’ll be surprised at just how fast you learn the cases and how your confidence grows when discussing their finer points. I am supremely confident that you will also find yourself returning to the book when studying both for insight and refreshment of knowledge, and I quietly hope you will be equally excited whenever you turn to this unprecedented resource.

Please remember that it was you the worldwide readers, that inspired this book, so you owe it to yourselves to buy it (and use the hell out of it) and to tell your peers and friends everywhere, so that they too can work towards becoming an ‘A‘ student in English law.

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Armitage v Nurse

English Equity & Trusts

Armitage v Nurse
Image: ‘Deere Country’ by Michael Humphries

To read about this case in greater depth, and with the benefit of full OSCOLA referencing, simply purchase a copy of ‘The Case Law Compendium: English & European Law’ from leading booksellers around the world.

Where can I buy it?

The book is available now through most Amazon sites thanks to the brilliance of Print on Demand (POD) technology and it is also printed through Ingram Spark (aka Lightning Source), who, through their worldwide  partnership agreements, supply ‘The Case Law Compendium’ to almost 40,000 retailers, libraries, schools and universities while providing worldwide shipping as standard.

America

Amazon.com, Barnes & Noble

Australia & New Zealand

Booktopia

Britain

 Amazon,   BlackwellWaterstones

Canada

AmazonChapters Indigo

France

Amazon

Germany

Amazon

India

Amazon

Italy

Amazon

Japan

Amazon

Latin America

Amazon Brazil

Amazon Mexico

Spain

Amazon

I cannot emphasise enough just how invaluable this book will become to you as your law course progresses, and you’ll be surprised at just how fast you learn the cases and how your confidence grows when discussing their finer points. I am supremely confident that you will also find yourself returning to the book when studying both for insight and refreshment of knowledge, and I quietly hope you will be equally excited whenever you turn to this unprecedented resource.

Please remember that it was you the worldwide readers, that inspired this book, so you owe it to yourselves to buy it (and use the hell out of it) and to tell your peers and friends everywhere, so that they too can work towards becoming an ‘A‘ student in English law.

– Remember that with ‘The Case Law Compendium’ you can do it.

Electronic Signatures Neil