Psychological dependence upon a surgical procedure to establish a definite sense of identity, lies within the heart of this matter when a transgender patient experiences disappointment with the outcome of hormone treatment and seeks remedy from the National Health Service (NHS).
Having experienced a life of emotional turmoil and unrelenting conflict with the gender nature afforded him, a man takes the steps required to adjust his gender to that of a woman, inasmuch as reassignment procedures will allow. While not yet at the point of invasive surgery, the appellant elected to follow course of therapy that by its own methodology, would increase his existing breast tissue to that of an average woman; thereby removing any fears that members of society would, on a superficial level, ever confuse him with a man.
At the conclusion of the programme, the appellant was left with only a minimal increase in tissue growth, and the inadequacy felt lingered to the point of mild depression and disillusionment with both himself and the future. Following consultation with his consultant psychiatrist, his case was put forward to the relevant Primary Care Trust, in the hope that both the poor outcome of the biological intervention and the circumstantial criteria of the Gender Dysphoria and Cosmetic Breast Surgery Policies would allow funding for breast augmentation (augmentation mammoplasty) to redress the balance.
Having had prior experience of transgender applications for the mammoplasty, and in the knowledge that current policy considers the procedure to be low priority, the Primary Care Trust conducted independent research to establish if there was sufficient data to support the claim that breast augmentation was important enough to have a positive impact upon a patient’s life and mental health, in claims where such surgical adjustments are compellingly argued.
Despite previous case discussions around the subject, the results of the investigative report concluded that there remained insufficient justification to amend the policy, and so unless in the case of extreme symptoms, the funding could not be provided, and that the patients would need to seek their own source of revenue. When first refused, and in consideration of two complaints to the Health Commission, the second application failed again, before a request for judicial review was presented. On this occasion, the application for review was dismissed, before the appellant moved to argue for funding on grounds of human rights violations and discrimination.
Citing art.8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (right to respect for private and family life) and art.14 (prohibition of discrimination), it was contested that denial of surgery was a breach of that right, and constituted excessive demands for an emotionally distressed transgender to suffer beyond that of an equally unhappy natural woman when determining eligibility for funding; and that such distinction resulted in nothing less than discrimination between the two types of patient.
Having evaluated the history behind the matter, and the recent investigatory methods used by the NHS, it was concluded that great attention had been placed upon the equality of a patients emotional well-being, and that unilateral guidelines were exacting enough to determine when funding was appropriate. This decision was supported in the decisory notes, which read that any patient seeking to obtain funding for policy procedures must demonstrate (i) that the patient’s case constitutes exceptional circumstances, (ii) that there is evidence of significant health benefit from the requested treatment, and (iii) there is evidence of the intervention improving health status.
On this occasion, the court quickly agreed that despite evidence of ‘chronic mild to moderate distress’ conveyed by the patient’s doctor, there was simply nothing to suggest that his situation was any more exceptional than a patient denied the resources, or that his symptoms were similar to those qualifying, transgender or otherwise, thus the court upheld the claim dismissal while also holding that:
“[G]ender and clinical needs are both relevant characteristics. Their aetiology is relevant diagnostically, but what are more critically relevant are the ethical and clinical judgments of the PCT, provided these do not transgress the law.”