‘Derogation from grant’ and the conclusive nature of conveyances were judicially clarified when a landowner divided his estate into two distinct plots before individually auctioning them to separate purchasers under identical contracts, whereupon litigation commenced over their right to enjoy both privacy and right to light.
With a brick wall dividing the two plots, the second sale left the respondent with a brick building situated fairly close to the wall with three windows facing the first plot but withspace enough to allow natural light to pass through them, and while both contracts mirrored one another, neither included any express reservations aside from a vague stipulation that the first lot was subject to a favourable right for the purchasers and occupiers of the second plot for a indeterminable period.
Roughly five years later the appellant erected a fence obscuring the respondent’s view when using his workshop, which prompted his demolition of the obstruction on principle that when taking ownership of the property it was under an implied easement inherited from the vendor and therefore lawfully enforceable, however this resulted in litigation in which the court noted how the vendor had failed to include any express reservation to the two parties and so awarded in favour of the appellant and ordered an injunction to prevent further trespasses.
Challenged in the Court of Appeal, the Court merely upheld the previous judgment on grounds that should English law adopt a view that implied rights and reservations were automatic to a conveyance, the rights of ownership and peaceful use and enjoyment of land would be violated beyond all reason, while reminding the parties that:
“[N]o implication can be made of a reservation of an easement to the grantor, although there may be an implication of a grant to the grantee.”
As I move ever closer to the completion of this ‘epic’ case law collection, I am happy to say that I have now finished writing the property law section, and while it’s one of the shorter chapters, the cases studied have been nothing short of diverse, which made a refreshing change from the often narrow English property law cases I have become so accustomed to reading in the past, and during my time as an undergraduate.
All mumblings aside, below is the final list, and I can only hope that you enjoy reading them as much as I enjoyed studying them over the previous several weeks, while for me it’s now time to get started on the final ‘tort law’ discipline.
Specific performance and cessation of contract on grounds of mistake, are both viable arguments for either continuation of contractual obligations, or the cessation of a transaction for reasons non-detrimental to both contractees. However, both approaches rely upon the honesty and accountability of at least one party should the courts take a view to upholding either of them.
In this instance, a Gujarati widower entered into an agreement to convey a determinate plot of land for an agreed sum, yet immediately after signing the disposition, she tore up the document and refused to continue with the transaction on grounds that she had been misled as to (i) the size of the plot, and (ii) the identity of the individual to whom the purchaser was planning to sell it to.
During initial litigation in the Supreme Court of Kenya, her argument for the fraudulent misrepresentation was based upon her limited grasp of the English language, and so she had elected a representative to be present with her at the time of signing. However, it was also argued that no mention had been given of the size of the plot, which in the first instance was alleged to be half an acre, and not the two acres contained within the conveyance, a fact discovered only after the signing.
When cross-examined, the respondent was proven to have falsified the statement, and thus her witness was accused of perjury, whereas contrastingly, the appellant contested that during preliminary talks, the proposed plot was described as two acres, and not the half-acre suggested.
The contract itself was signed in the presence of a third party, however the respondent also relied upon the contention that at no point during an earlier meeting did anybody translate the contents of the contract, despite the appellant claiming that not only did he explain it, but that the respondent’s cousin had also clarified its contents to her.
It was likewise argued by the appellant that the respondent tore up the contract, not because of the plot variation, but upon the knowledge that the land was to be resold to an individual she disliked, however this was also proven to be untrue after lengthy cross-examination and questioning of oral evidence.
Upon summation, the trial judge awarded in favour of the appellant, despite reservations around the integrity of both parties, and so when presented to the Court of Appeal of East Africa, the Court took issue with the reliability of the appellant’s statements and proceeded to reexamine the facts, before reaching the same conclusion as the lower court.
Take finally to the House of Lords, it was noted that vol. 2 of ‘Williams on Vendor and Purchaser’ clearly illustrated that:
“[A]s a rule, either party to a contract to sell land is entitled to sue in equity for specific performance of the agreement. This right is, in general, founded on a breach of the contract, but not in the same manner as the right to sue at law. The court has no jurisdiction to award damages at law except in case of a breach of the contract; while the equitable jurisdiction to order an agreement to be specifically performed is not limited to the cases in which at law damages could be recoverable.”
Which translated that when contracting parties hold a good account of themselves throughout their dealings, equity would provide sufficient weight as to instigate specific performance; yet on this occasion, neither party had been anywhere near as truthful as a court would rightfully expect, and so on this principle it was impossible to uphold the appeal, nor enforce the equitable rights of the appellant, or those forwarded by the respondent, thus the appeal was dismissed while the House held that:
“In equity all that is required is to show circumstances which will justify the intervention by a court of equity.”
The conveyance of land with restrictive covenants is not uncommon within property law, however when the safeguard designed to protect the needs of the vendor becomes central to his anguish, it becomes clear that the attached principles have become somewhat misused.
In a matter concerning the part-sale of an orchard by a farmer, the respondent entered into the purchase on the understanding that at no point was the road running between the two plots previously owned, to exceed the height beyond that of the section retained, as to do otherwise would impact upon the farmer’s ability to harvest his remaining plot.
After ignoring the covenant, the respondent began resurfacing the road to a height that did in fact exceed the permissions granted, thus prompting the appellant to protest both orally and by letter. When the work continued and his obvious displeasure went unheard, the appellant issued a writ in pursuit of a mandatory injunction, which would result in the removal of all works undertaken at cost to the respondent.
In the first hearing, the judge adopted the unorthodox position of taking two negatives in order to create a positive. This was executed through an injunction, while explaining that:
(i) The respondent was to modify the road so as to benefit the appellant, rather than to remove it outright, after having spent around £1400 on its construction, before paying the appellant £1062 in special damages for the harm caused to date.
(ii) The mandatory injunction was to remain ineffective for a period of three years, while the respondent set about altering the road’s layout, which itself required agreement by the appellant to trespass onto his land in order to carry out the work.
(iii) That consultation between the two parties would continue throughout this period, and that should the appellant refuse to consent to the needs of the respondent, the respondent would be granted sufficient argument so as to discharge the injunction entirely.
Upon immediate appeal, the appellant argued that the judge had erred in law when creating an injunction that rendered the breach of covenant void, that requirement to consent to the work would result in a trespass and that such an impingement and modification would cause the appellant to suffer both personally and financially, as his own orchard would be compromised during the alterations.
With consideration of the judge’s genuine wish to improve upon an already damaging situation, the Court held that when refusing to enforce the injunction with immediate effect, the court had failed to properly address the purpose of both the covenant and the injunction in favour of an outcome serving only the needs of the breaching party.
There are within the discipline of equity, a number of maxims reverted to when settling many common law matters. The aim of this article is to present them in as exhaustive a manner as possible, while including notable cases that explain their application.
Equity follows the Law (Aequitas sequitur legem)
The nature of equity is one that supports, rather than overrules the balance of justice, however it must also be stressed that where the moment calls, equity will go against those principles in pursuit of a fair outcome that common law fails to provide. A suitable case example for this isStack v Dowden, in which an unmarried couple shared a home for over twenty years while raising their children, until the time came for separation. Upon parting, the father argued that as the two parties enjoyed joint legal title, beneficial interest was automatically deemed equal, unless robustly proven otherwise.
This sentiment was echoed in the above maxim, and until this case had been presented, it remained common law that equal beneficial interest was assumed to mirror that of legal title; however, the evidence presented by the respondent was overwhelming to the point that for the first time, the percentages were divided heavily in favour of the mother, while this reexamination of beneficial assumption was instigated by Baroness Hale of Richmond, who urged:
“The issue as it has been framed before us is whether a conveyance into joint names indicates only that each party is intended to have some beneficial interest but says nothing about the nature and extent of that beneficial interest, or whether a conveyance into joint names establishes a prima facie case of joint and equal beneficial interests until the contrary is shown.”
Where the equities are equal, the law will prevail
Frequently tied to property dealings, this maxim relates to two parties seeking title to a property without awareness of each others rights. An example of this might be a beneficiary to an estate who is unaware that a third party has since acquired legal title by means of a purchase (as sometime happens when wills are not updated nor properly constructed). The courts will view both potential owners as equal, however where the legal owner can prove ownership free of fraud, the latter will succeed. This position was underlined in Pilcher v Rawlins, where it was clarified by James LJ that:
“[S]uch a purchaser’s plea of a purchase for valuable consideration without notice is an absolute, unqualified, unanswerable defence, and an unanswerable plea to the jurisdiction of this court. Such a purchaser, when he has once put in a plea, may be interrogated and tested to any extent as to the valuable consideration which he given in order to show bona fide or male fides of his purchase, and also the presence of the absence of notice; but when once he has gone through that ordeal, and has satisfied the terms of the plea of purchase for valuable consideration without notice, then…this Court has no jurisdiction whatever to do anything more then allow him to depart in possession of that legal estate.”
Equity looks to the substance rather than the form
This is a fairly descriptive maxim that serves to keep focus on legal proceedings in such a way that holds the principle of fairness above that of policy or written codes of conduct. This is not to say that where statute dictates a course of action, equity will seek to ignore that; in fact, under those terms, the black letter of legislation will always win the day.
Instead, equity looks at the form of the subject matter, rather than allowing the intention to dissolve in favour of caveats that work against common law, and obstruct a proper outcome. This was demonstrated through the words of Lord Romily Mr in Parkin v Thorold, who remarked that an agreement between a vendor and purchaser did not rest upon the limitations of time, and that when charges brought against the vendor for specific performance altered the essence of the contract, it was equity that referred the parties to the form of the arrangement:
“[T]ime was originally not of essence of the contract…although express notice will make time of the essence of the contract, where a reasonable time is specified…the notice of the 21st October did not specify a reasonable time for this purpose.”
Equity will not permit statute to be used as a cloak for fraud
While perhaps limited in scope, the effects of this maxim can be appreciated within property law matters, as it is a legal requirement under section 53(1)(b) of the Law of Property Act 1924 that any contracts for sale or occupancy must be written. And so in Bannister v Bannister, the owner of a property conveyed a party rent free occupancy of the home for life, after which they tried to evict them. It was then argued by the defendant that an oral contract existed which thus defeated the act of statute when the respondent went back on their promise.
Equity imputes an intention to fulfil an obligation
Relating to ambition and intention, the aim here is to hold to account the statements or actions by a party that are later required to be enforced, regardless of any reasonable changes in circumstance, and when the court finds that no such fulfilment has occurred, the obligation to do so will be levied through equity.
An example of this is Lechmere v Lady Lechmere, in which a Lord bound himself to purchase land for an agreed sum, that would then pass through death to his wife. Upon his passing, it was discovered that he had failed to uphold his requirement during the lifetime of their marriage, by purchasing other lands that now fell within the residue of his estate, and required a successor in title other than his son. Through the application of this maxim, the court allowed the transfer to his wife for the amount agreed, and thus his obligations were deemed satisfied, as was expressed within the judgment which read:
“[W]herever a thing is to be done either upon a condition, or within a time certain, yet if a recompence can be made which agrees in substance, though perhaps not in every formal circumstance, such a recompence shall be good, and shall go in satisfaction of the thing covenanted to be done.”
Equity regards as done that which ought to be done
There are times in law where the misdeeds of others wind up obscuring the natural order of events, and so it is that the equitable maxim above is crucial to redressing the imbalance, and putting matters where equity can reign. A fitting case example would beAttorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid, where a senior crown prosecutor received bribes to obstruct the course of justice, while employed in a manner that bestowed fiduciary duties.
When it was discovered that those illegal payments had been invested in a number of properties, it was agreed that those homes were held on trust by the appellant for the benefit of the Crown; and while the rules of equity prevent a debtor to the injured party being a trustee for the monies received, the Court of Appeal allowed that conflict to stand in order for the outcome to find form, and for natural remedy to occur. This decision was supported by Lord Templeman, who commented:
“It is unconscionable for a fiduciary to obtain and retain a benefit from a breach of duty. The provider of a bribe cannot recover it because he committed a criminal offence when he paid the bribe. The false fiduciary who received the bribe in breach of duty must pay and account for the bribe to the person to whom that duty was owed.”
Equity acts in personam
Because some matters involve effects belonging to individuals that may have since moved abroad, the principle that equity acts against the person provides domestic courts with an ability to extend their reach without interruption of foreign laws. This may come into play when a property owner or business person has entered into a contract that binds them within the United Kingdom, but whose absence may permit avoidance of liability for remedy. There are of course limitations to this maxim, and where the laws of the country occupied prevent such imposition, the party accused may yet evade its grasp. This was explained by Lord Cottenham in ex parte Pollard, when he outlined:
“[C]ontracts respecting lands in countries not within the jurisdiction of these courts…can only be enforced by proceedings in personam which courts of equity are constantly in the habit of doing; not thereby in any respect interfering with the lex loci res sitae.”
Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy (ubi jus ibi remediam)
Much like the founding principle of equity itself, there are times when common law can inadvertently create unjust reward for those who deserve no such fortune. And so it is that when defective legal rulings are left wanting, the maxim ‘no misdeed should go unpunished’ can be applied to restore equality, while in many respects mirroring the maxim ‘equity regards as done that which ought to be done’.
An example of this is Ashby v White, in which a member of the public community was denied the right to vote by local policemen, who wrongly acted on the damning advice of parish members, claiming he was unfit to cast opinion. When taken to court, the claimant was awarded damages, after which the ruling was later overturned in favour of the policemen.
This compelled the man to issue a writ of error against Parliament on grounds that such a verdict allowed any member of a local authority to choose who could vote, when such powers were conferred upon central government. When it was appreciated that a legal process had allowed this kind of miscarriage, the initial judgment was upheld and damages paid, while the court expressed that:
“[A]s all parliamentary causes are to be determined in parliament, it was conceived that this matter was properly determinable in the House of Commons only; and that the courts of Westminster-Hall not being authorized by any act of parliament, had no cognisance of it.”
He who seeks equity must do equity
‘Do unto others as you would have them do to you’, might be another phrase better known to some, and so again equity commands the same from those seeking remedy. It is after all, the bedrock of law that fairness and equability must at all times remain in view should the rule of law justify its own existence; so when one party brings action against another, it must act accordingly should it wish those accused to do the same. An excellent example of this is Chappell v Times Newspapers, where Megarry J explained:
“If the plaintiff asks for an injunction to restrain a breach of contract to which he is a party, and he is seeking to uphold that contract in all its parts, he is, in relation to that contract, ready to do equity. If on the other hand he seeks the injunction but in the same breath is constrained to say that he is ready and willing himself to commit grave breaches of the contract…then it seems to me that the plaintiff cannot very well contend that in relation to that contract he is ready to do equity.”
He who comes to equity must come with clean hands
Once again we look to integrity and depth of character when assessing claims of inequitable conduct, except those claiming must themselves prove their argument does not rest upon misdeeds of their own within the parameters of the matter. An example of this isHasham v Zenab or Barrett v Barrett, where two brothers worked together to avoid the loss of a property during business liquidation.
When the party losing their business asks the other to purchase the home (held by the assigned trustee) before refurbishing it and selling it for a substantial profit, the buyer later refuses to pass the sale proceeds back to his sibling. The brother retaliates by taking action against him, but unfortunately during the hearing it emerges that the former owner acted in collusion so as to avoid surrendering the property as payment to his creditors, therefore his request for equitable remedy was built upon deception and avoidance of duties owed. This lapse of moral fibre was explained by Richards J, who noted:
“He has in effect pleaded the unlawful purpose in paragraph 15(1)(a) of his particulars of claim : the purpose of purchasing the property in the name of John was “to avoid its being repossessed by the Trustee in Bankruptcy”. Without that purpose, the agreement or arrangement has no rational explanation. Thomas needs to allege and prove it in order to establish the agreement, but in doing so he relies on his own illegal purpose and thereby renders his interest unenforceable.”
Delay defeats equity
Fettered through the confines of the Limitation Act 1980 and the estoppel doctrine of laches, this maxim underlines that when seeking legal remedy, it is imperative that the claimant moves to argue with haste, as the passage of time will ultimately work against any reasons to the contrary. That aside, there are particular beneficiary rights exempt from delay, and those include breach of fiduciary duty, undue influence or recession of contract; while s.36 of the 1980 Act refuses to prevent claims on grounds of acquiescence, as this in itself can stand as evidence of that restraint. An excellent case for the examination of this maxim is Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co, in which Lord Jackson cited the comments in Lindsay Petroleum Co v Hurd:
“The doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where, by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case if an argument against relief which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
Equity will not allow a trust to fail for want of a trustee
As clearly explained within the title, this maxim states that in the event that a trust has been constructed in the absence of a trustee, or that through time those appointed have since passed, the courts will take the necessary steps to ensure the trust is honoured, and a suitable trustee will stand in receipt. This power is conferred to the courts under the Trustee Act 1925 and requires no reliance upon common law to succeed.
Equality is equity (aequalitus est quasi equitas)
Often applied to manage the distribution of assets between beneficiaries, this maxim will allow the court to distribute equal shares between any number of parties where no prior agreement has been found. While used primarily with trusts, this is also found in divorce proceedings, where evidence aside, the husband and wife cannot fully establish the exact proportions of the monies remaining after the fact. An example of this is Burrough v Philcox where Lord Chancellor Cottenham remarked:
“I think myself justified in giving effect to the intention, which appears to me to be sufficiently apparent upon the will, of giving the property to the nephews and nieces, and their children, subject to the selection and distribution of the survivor of the son and daughter; and that they all constitute the class to take all the property as to which no such selection and distribution has been made.”
Equity will not assist a volunteer
In its most simplest of forms, this maxim provides that equity will not, by virtue of their proximity, assist a party indirectly involved in a matter of grant, whether by marriage or by trust (as is most often applied). In the latter instance, a lack of consideration for the benefits of such a trust automatically renders the claimant void of support when seeking remedy, and further renders them incapable of instructing a trustee to the same end. A volunteer can however, sue for breach of duty or agreement where they are so associated, and can attain that those in trust are there for the benefit of the volunteer and hold only for their needs (where applicable).
Equity will not perfect an imperfect gift
The willingness to give freely of something must extend beyond words and take effect through action, or equity cannot enforce the gesture within the courts. This would apply to anything under common law, but is typically found in property and trust matters where a party alleged to have been conferred that of a physical form are left wanting, and so in search of remedy through the principle above. An excellent case example for this denial is Curtis v Pulbrook, in which a company director made efforts to pass on a number of shares to his daughter while in the process of liquidation, but who did so without formalising the transfer within the requirements required under company law. In concluding the error, it was remarked by Justice Briggs that:
“…without his assistance in making available the duly completed stock transfer forms, neither his wife nor his daughter could perfect the intended gifts without further assistance from Mr. Pulbrook…it follows that there was not an effective gift of Mr Pulbrook’s beneficial interest either in the 14 or in the 300 shares which he attempted to give respectively to his daughter and to his wife so that, in the result, there is nothing to prevent the charging order being made final in relation to all of them.”