Undoubtedly one of my own personal favourites, this delicious combination of soft tender potatoes, with sweet tomato coated mung beans, never fails to satisfy when I make it, and I’m supremely confident that if you give it a try yourself, you’ll quickly become another fan of this truly ‘moreish’ meal.
Ingredients (Serves 4)
Slug of Olive Oil
175g Mung Beans
2 Medium Potatoes (Peeled and Cut into Small Dice)
Garlic Clove (Peeled and Grated)
1” Fresh Ginger (Peeled and Grated)
400g Tin of Chopped Tomatoes
Tbsp Tomato Purée
0.5 Tsp Cumin Seeds
0.5 Tsp Brown Sugar
6 Curry Leaves (Fresh or Dried)
0.5 Tsp Ground Turmeric
Medium Red or Green Chilli (Seeded and Finely Chopped)
Salt and Freshly Ground Pepper to Taste
How to Cook
1. Add the mung beans to the water and simmer in a small pan for around 30 minutes, draining away any excess liquid when finished.
2. Par-boil the diced potatoes in another small pan for around 9 minutes, draining away any excess liquid when finished.
3. Meanwhile heat the oil in a non-stick chef pan (or similar), add the cumin seeds, shortly followed by the garlic, chilli and ginger, before stir-frying until the garlic is soft but not browned.
4. Add the turmeric, salt and pepper, and sugar, and mix well before stir-frying for a further 1-2 minutes
5. Add the chopped tomatoes and tomato purée, and bring them to the boil before simmering covered for 6-8 minutes, or until the sauce has thickened.
6. Finally add the mung beans and potatoes and gently mix everything together before serving as required.
This awesome vegetarian dish goes brilliantly with warm chapatis, but is equally delightful with a simple plain basmati rice if preferred.
Uncertainty as to the exact class of trust beneficiary lies central to the disposition and taxation of funds, when after establishing two virtually identical charitable trusts (the Broadway Cottages Trust and the Sunnylands Trust), the nominated trustees and now appellants were faced with claims by the Inland Revenue that any monies generated by the use of the trust were lawfully subject to taxation under the Income Tax Act 1918.
In the summer of 1950, the now deceased settlor bequeathed a sum of £80,000 for the benefit of a number of beneficiaries, while the design was such that the appellants were granted discretionary powers to invest and apply the money, so as to accrue sufficient income for his wife and numerous other parties for the duration of the trust.
However the appellees claimed that clause 8 of the trust instrument was void for uncertainty, on grounds that while it stated in relevant part that:
“[T]he trustees shall hold the income of the trust fund from the date or respective dates from which the trustees shall become entitled to such income upon trust to apply the same for the benefit of all or any one or more of the donor’s said wife and the beneficiaries….”
The beneficiary schedule conversely included:
“1. All persons (other than the settlor and any wife of his and any infant child of his) who have been in the past or (as the case may be) at the date of these presents or subsequently thereto at any time during the period ending on December 31, 1980, or during the appointed period whichever shall be the shorter employed by: (a) the settlor; (b) the wife of the settlor; (c) William Timpson deceased (father of the settlor and who died on January 20, 1929); (d) Katherine Chapman Timpson deceased (mother of the settlor and who died on December 16, 1940); (e) William Timpson Limited or by any other limited company which may succeed to the business of William Timpson Limited; (/) Any other limited company of which the settlor is a director at the date of these presents.
2. The wives and widows of any such persons as is specified in cl. 1 of this schedule.
3. All persons (other than the settlor and any wife of his and any infant child of his) who are the issue however remote of the said William Timpson deceased . . . and Charles Henry Rutherford deceased (father of the wife of the settlor and who died on February 17, 1930).
4 , 5, 6, 7. [Certain named persons.]
8. Alastair John Grenville Stevenson and any spouse of his or issue of him.
9. [The trustees of the settlement and their spouses or issue].
10. Joseph Baker and any spouse of his or issue of him.
11. Godchildren of the settlor or his wife.
And so the appellees argued that there was no clear and ascertainable list of beneficiaries upon which to refer, while the appellants contended that the trust afforded them discretionary powers to assign the funds to those parties they believed to be ascertainable, and so the trust remained valid under clause 10, which read in relevant part that:
“The trustees shall also have power during the appointed period to apply the whole or any part of the capital of the trust fund in their discretion for the benefit of all or any one or more of the beneficiaries either by way of advancement on account of his or her or their share or shares or not as the trustees may in their discretion think fit….”
In the first instance, the Inland Revenue Special Commissioners reviewed the claim, and awarded for the respondents, while holding that:
“[T]he trusts of the settlement in so far as they related to the income of the trust fund were not void for uncertainty, and that the trustees under the provisions of cl. 8 of the settlement had a power of selection and that it was a valid and effective trust of the income of the trust fund, and that, accordingly, the sums of money received by the respondents from the trustees were the income of the respondents and thus entitled to the exemption claimed.”
Whereupon the appellees challenged the judgment in the Chancery Court, who allowed the appeal, while instead holding that:
“[I[n cases of an imperative trust to distribute there must be certainty as to the objects.”
Upon which the appellants challenged the judgment in the Court of Appeal, who then relied upon In re Gestetner Settlement, in which the Chancery Court had held that:
“[I]n a case where there is a duty on a trustee to select from a number of persons which of them shall be the recipients of the settlor’s bounty, there must be a certainty as to those recipients.”
Thus the court dismissed the appeal whilst reiterating to the parties that:
“[A] trust for such members of a given class of objects as the trustees shall select is void for uncertainty, unless the whole range of objects eligible for selection is ascertained or capable of ascertainment….”
Haddock is a great alternative to cod, and so this simple and yet nourishing dish ought to please most fish lovers, while its composition also proves that simplicity is always the key when cooking, as I am confident you will agree when you eventually get around to trying this recipe for yourself.
Ingredients (Serves 4)
Large Slug of Olive Oil
2 Leeks (Trimmed, Split and Finely Sliced)
4 Decent Sized Fresh Haddock Fillets (Un-skinned)
50g Green Beans (Trimmed and Chopped)
200ml Double Cream
Tsp English Mustard
Handful of Fresh Flat Leaf Parsley
Salt and Freshly Ground Pepper to taste
How to Cook
1. Place the haddock fillets on a plate, brush with a little olive oil and sprinkle with salt and pepper, before setting aside.
2. Heat the oil in a non-stick sauce pan (or similar), add the leeks and beans, and gently fry until soft and tender, straining off any residual liquid that appears.
3. Add the cream, salt and pepper, mustard and gently simmer in the cream until suitably thickened.
4. Add some oil to a non-stick frying pan, and gently fry the haddock fillets until browned underneath.
5. Place the partially cooked fillets on a non-stick roasting tray in the centre of an oven, (preheated to 170°) and continue to cook them for another 3-4 minutes.
6. Remove the fillets, place the cooked vegetables in the center of four plates, gently resting each haddock fillet on top, and then carefully spoon the sauce over the top before serving.
This particular meal is perfect with a nice side of mashed or roast potatoes, and goes equally well with a crisp leaf salad and chilled white wine, if preferred.
Drawing the line between judicial governance of the family unit, or in the very least of cases, domestic relationships, was a task discussed in a case dating back to 1868, in which a spouse was prone to seek reparation in the criminal courts when her husband struck her in a manner designed to enforce compliance at a time when women and children’s rights were quite literally unheard of.
Having suffered three blows of the defendant’s switch, which by law could be no wider than a man’s thumb, (hence the phrase ‘rule of thumb’), the defendant was indicted for assault and battery before the North Carolina Supreme Court, on grounds that his actions were unprovoked and therefore unlawful, and upon which the court was tasked with an examination of leading case precedent in order to ‘draw the line’ as to when they were entitled to probe further into such apparently trifle matters.
In the first instance, the court turned to State v. Hussey, in which the court had recently held that:
“[A] wife may be a witness against her husband for felonies perpetrated, or attempted to be perpetrated on her, and we would say for an assault and battery which inflicted or threatened a lasting injury or great bodily harm; but in all cases of a minor grade she is not.”
Before reviewing State v. Black, in which the court had more recently held that:
“A husband is responsible for the acts of his wife, and he is required to govern his household, and for that purpose the law permits him to use towards his wife such a degree of force as is necessary to control an unruly temper and make her behave herself; and unless some permanent injury be inflicted, or there be an excess of violence, or such a degree of cruelty as shows that it is inflicted to gratify his own bad passions, the law will not invade the domestic forum or go behind the curtain.”
While also choosing to venture further into the use of physical discipline not only upon wives, but children, both at home and in the school system, where the court gave weight to State v. Pendergrass, in which the court earlier held that:
“[T]eachers exceed the limits of their authority when they cause lasting mischief; but act within the limits of it, when they inflict temporary pain.”
And so with a brief review of existing legal opinion, much of which was in a state of conflict when it came to both the use of ‘correctional’ force, and the means with which it could be dispensed, the court insisted that without further evidence of argument to the contrary, they were reluctant, if not powerless, to delve beyond the facade of marital or educational affairs unless there was compelling evidence that the injuries complained of were to prove lasting and detrimental to either party’s health, thus the case was dismissed in full while the court rightly or wrongly held that:
“Every household has and must have, a government of its own, modelled to suit the temper, disposition and condition of its inmates.”
Circumstantial evidence of crimes committed beyond the realm of an immediate offence, can be used to support the conviction of a defendant, but only when such information demonstrates an overwhelming similarity to that used in the matter at hand, as was found in a truly disturbing case involving multiple rapes and eventual murder of an innocent victim that instead chose to fight back during her ordeal.
Sometime in 1977, the appellant was indicted and convicted of second degree murder in the New York County Supreme Court, following the stabbing and strangulation of what was to be his seventh victim in less than six months.
Upon his appeal in the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division, the appellant argued that in the absence of any witnesses, and with its verdict resting solely upon the witness testimony of his six previous rape victims, there was insufficient grounds to sustain his conviction beyond a reusable doubt.
In response, the court first turned to People v. Molineux, in which the New York Court of Appeals had held that:
“[W]hen evidence of an extraneous crime is admissible to prove the crime for which a defendant is on trial, it is not necessary to prove every fact and circumstance relating to the extraneous crime that would be essential to sustain a conviction thereof.”
And so in order to ascertain the weight of evidence before them, the court went on to note that in each of the previous six rapes, the appellant had (i) informed the victims that his alleged wife or fiancée had been recently attacked and injured, (ii) seized his victims by the throat, (iii) threatened his victims with a knife, (iv) made physical contact with their lingerie collection, (v) forced his victims to wear specifically chosen underwear, and (vi) stolen property from their apartments after raping them.
While on this occasion, the victim had screamed out for help, a resistance which resulted in the appellant strangling her with her own underwear before wounding her with a knife multiple times, both of which, while different in their effect, bore very close resemblance to his previous methodology, and to which the appellant contested that in People v. Goldstein the New York Court of Appeals had later held that:
“[E]vidence that defendant committed other or similar offenses is not admissible to prove his guilt of the crime for which he is being tried. One may not be convicted of one crime on proof that he probably is guilty because he committed another crime.”
However the court rightly determined that in addition to the circumstantial similarities shown by the six previous rapes, there was also compelling witness testimony as to the appellant’s voice pattern, and his whereabouts both before and after the offence discussed, and so with little hesitation the court upheld the supreme court conviction in full, while holding that:
“Another crime or crimes of the defendant are not admissible to establish that the defendant committed the crime charged where the only connection between the crimes is a similar modus operandi. If, however, the modus operandi is sufficiently unique logically to point to the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime charged, evidence of the other crimes is admissible.”
This is a deliciously simple, and yet comforting dish that can be prepared and cooked with minimum fuss, and is also perfect for this time of year. If you want to jazz the taste up a little, then by all means use pork sausages with chilli seasoning, or even paprika if you can buy them in your local supermarket, either way it will still go down well.
Ingredients (Serves 4)
A Large Slug of Olive Oil
8 Cumberland Sausages
Medium Onion (Finely Sliced)
2 Garlic Cloves (Peeled and Grated)
200g Split Peas
Small Bottle Red Wine
2 Sprigs of Whole Fresh Thyme (or 2 tsps Dried Thyme)
500ml Chicken Stock
6 Tbsps Crème Fraîche
Tbsp Dijon Mustard
Salt and Freshly Ground Pepper to taste
How to Cook
1. Heat the oil in a non-stick chef pan (or similar) and gently stir-fry the sausages until golden brown, and then remove them and set aside on kitchen paper to soak up any excess fat.
2. Add the butter to the pan, and stir-fry the onions and garlic until the onions are lightly golden and soft.
3. Add the split peas andred wine, and then simmer to reduce the wine by half, before adding the stock and seasoning, along with salt and freshly ground pepper to taste.
4. Cover the pan and then simmer everything gently for 1 hour, or until the split peas are tender to touch.
5. Meanwhile combine the crème fraîche and mustard in a small bowl.
6. Once cooled, slice the sausages into 1″ thick slices, and add them to the pan, before simmering everything again for a further 5 minutes in order to heat the sliced sausages through.
7. Serve equally into bowls and then add a hearty dollop of the crème fraîche and mustard mix on top before serving.
This dish would go well with either buttered mashed potatoes, or even a nice fluffy basmati rice if preferred, or simply with a buttered crusty bread of your choice.
Today I sit here grinning like a Cheshire cat in the knowledge that I have now completed just over half of the criminal law section of this incredible compendium, and when I calculate the hours spent writing and researching even this chapter, it’s a testament to my perseverance and absolute commitment to completing a body of work that is undoubtedly the biggest writing project I have ever undertaken.
When you consider that each case can take anywhere between 3-5 hours to read, analyse, research and write (and some even longer), and that I have been working on this section alone since late July 2018, my excitement and pride in having got this far is spilling over, and I genuinely cannot wait to see how this book looks and reads when its finally finished next year; while I would also add that its often proved harrowing having to read about some horrific acts of cruelty, not only to adults but also to young and innocent children, and its shown how awful human nature can be sometimes, but then again I wholly accept that it goes with the territory of crime, which perhaps also shows why it’s by far the largest section of the book.
Anyway without waffling on too much about my own struggles, below is a list of the first 63 cases contained within this particular segment, and next week I begin working on the final 61 cases before moving on to property law. Phew!