Moore v. Elmer (1901)

US Contract Law

Moore v. Elmer
‘Clairvoyant-Veritas’ by Gabriel Von Max

A promise to pay while absent of any consideration may at first blush appear to be enforceable, however the eyes of the law see things in quite a different light, as was found in this rather bizarre suit between a clairvoyant and the administrators of an estate.

For reasons best known to themselves, the plaintiff and former client had somehow entered into a bargain, whereby a written statement in January 1898 expressed that:

“In consideration of business and test sittings received from Madame Sesemore, the clairvoyant, otherwise known as Mrs. Josephene L. Moore on numerous occasions I the undersigned do hereby agree to give the above named Josephene or her heirs, if she is not alive, the balance of her mortgage note which is the Herman E. Bogardus mortgage note of Jan. 5, 1893, and the interest on same on or after the last day of Jan. 1900, if my death occurs before then which she has this day predicted and claims to be the truth, and which I the undersigned strongly doubt. 

Wherein if she is right I am willing to make a recompense to her as above stated, but not payable unless death occurs before 1900. Willard Elmer.”

And so upon his death, the plaintiff sued for recovery in the Hampden County Superior Court, while his various family members argued that the claim was void for want of consideration, after which the court dismissed the suit and the matter was argued again before the Massachusetts Supreme Court.

Here the court turned first to Chamberlain v. Whitford, wherein it had held that:

“An executed and past consideration is not sufficient to support a subsequent promise. It is not enough to show that a service has been rendered, and that it was beneficial to the party sought to be charged, unless it was rendered at his express request, or under such circumstances that the law would imply a request.”

While in Dearborn v. Brown the court had earlier held that:

“[T]he past performance of services constitutes no consideration even for an express promise, unless they were performed at the express or implied request of the defendant, or unless they were done in performance of some duty or obligation resting on the defendant.”

To which it had been evident that no money had been exchanged for the readings, nor any express terms set out during their meetings. And so when summarising the fruitlessness of the claim, the court finally relied upon Johnson v. Kimball in which it had later held that:

“An executed gift is neither consideration for an express contract nor a ground for implying one as a fiction of law.”

Thus the claim was one without merit and so the suit was again dismissed to the relief of the surviving parties and the dismay of a wanton clairvoyant, although one might have expected her to learn of the outcome prior to any litigation.

Greiner v. Greiner (1930)

US Contract Law

Greiner v Greiner
Image: ‘Plaza Lights, Kansas City’ by Thomas Kinkade

Inducement of consideration on the part of a promisee to a contract, whether written or oral, is an action that while not seemingly of benefit to the promisor, requires completion of the gesture by lawful means should natural justice be seen to be done.

In 1926, the appellant inherited a substantial amount of land from one of her sons, after which she aimed to use it to make amends for her late husband’s death, whose own will had disinherited four of his children, while the remaining four became beneficiaries to portions of his estate.

By way of reparation, the appellant sought the counsel of a number of those children, while on a number of occasions, explaining that she intended for the respondent to relocate from his home in Logan County, to a plot estimated at around 80-97 acres in size. This became problematic for the respondent as he was indebted by way of mortgage and could not just ‘up sticks’ and move, at which point the appellant took steps to reassign the mortgage to herself, so as to allow the respondent to take up residence on the land set aside for him.

This was duly executed until around a year later, when the respondent was served with a notice to quit by one of his brothers, whereupon he sought remedy by way of a conveyance from the appellant to support his right to title. Given that the appellant was illiterate, it became apparent that she had not taken the steps needed to complete such a disposition, but had instead relied upon her own insistence that she would bequeath him the land by way of a will, which was yet to be drafted.

When heard at the district court, the judge ruled in favour of the respondent, whereupon the appellant contested it within the Supreme Court of Kansas. Here, reference was made to s.32 of the Restatement Law of Contracts which reads:

“In case of doubt an offer is interpreted as inviting the offeree to accept either by promising to perform what the offer requests or by rendering the performance, as the offeree chooses.”

While s.90 of the same document reads:

“A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance, is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”

Which translated that despite a failure to endorse her intentions through written expression, the appellant had by virtue of her repeated declarations, created an enforceable contract of disposition that by extension had led to the relocation of the respondent on the pretence that title was both implied and ultimately due through either deed or testamentary powers. It was this irreversible fact that led the Court to uphold the previous decision and dismiss the appeal outright on grounds that financial remedy would not be sufficient to the cause in hand.