United States v. Falcone

US Criminal Law

United States v. Falcone
‘Oranges and Antique Moonshine Jugs’ by J.R. Secor

Criminal conspiracy, while simple enough in its description, is an offence often hard to quantify, and so on this occasion the actions of a lawful vendor proved hard to distinguish from those charged, which resulted in an outcome some may find contradictory to the rule of law.

Indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, the respondent was later convicted as a party to facilitating prohibited still operations, whereupon he challenged the judgment in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on grounds that when selling sugar to his co-defendants, the respondent did so without conscious knowledge of its intended use.

Here the court noted that despite numerous States ruling on the principle, there remained a division as to when a defendant became a co-conspirator, and so in this instance the court elected to follow U.S. v. Peoni, in which it had held that:

“Nobody is liable in conspiracy except for the fair import of the concerted purpose or agreement as he understands it….”

Thereby reversing the trial court judgment, while holding that:

“Civilly, a man’s liability extends to any injuries which he should have apprehended to be likely to follow from his acts. If they do, he must excuse his conduct by showing that the interest which he was promoting outweighed the dangers which its protection imposed upon others….”

Whereupon the Government pressed their argument before the U.S. Supreme Court under writ of certiorari, who proceeded to examine the facts as presented.

For clarity, 18 U.S.C.A. § 550 (now §2) stated that:

“Whoever directly commits any act constituting an offense defined in any law of the United States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission, is a principal….”

And so the Court held that in mind when referring to Pettibone v. U.S., in which it had held that:

“A conspiracy is sufficiently described as a combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means….”

Before noting that in U.S. v. Hirsch it had also held that:

“Although by the statute something more than the common-law definition of a conspiracy is necessary to complete the offence, to wit, some act done to effect the object of the conspiracy, it remains true that the combination of minds in an unlawful purpose is the foundation of the offence, and that a party who did not join in the previous conspiracy cannot, under this section, be convicted on the overt act.”

Thus the Court was left with no other option than to uphold the court of appeal judgment, while conclusively holding that:

“Those having no knowledge of the conspiracy are not conspirators…”

The constitutional law section is now complete.

United States Law: A Case Study Collection

Constitutional Law 2
‘Flag’ by Jasper Johns

May 25 2018

I have to admit to feeling somewhat sad that this part of the book is now over, largely because I’ve thoroughly enjoyed learning about American history through the historic cases studied, and also because my understanding and deep appreciation of the Federal Constitution has grown from being almost non-existent, to virtually integral to my fundamental outlook on life, while also helping me realise just how unprotected U.K. citizens are, despite the Human Rights Act 1998, and more especially because after the whole ‘Brexit’ travesty there is soon to be no more protection offered through the European Court of Human Rights.

In all honesty I feel I now identify more with America than ever before, and given that I’ve never visited the country, there are certainly more compelling reasons than ever to get that arranged, perhaps if I sell enough copies of this compendium, that moment might just arrive, who knows?

As a side note I also recently learned that my mother’s biological father was born and raised in San Francisco, so I guess that makes me part American, right?

Anyway, I digress, and so here is the list of cases that can be found in the constitutional law section of the compendium. I hope I haven’t missed any out, and I will close this chapter by saying that it’s been great fun going on this part of the journey, and I will certainly miss it.

Constitutional Law

1. Allgeyer v. State of Louisiana

2. Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett

3. Bolling v. Sharpe

4. Boumediene v. Bush

5. Brandenburg v. Ohio

6. Branzburg v. Hayes

7. Brown v. Board of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan.

8. Buckley v. Valeo

9. Bush v. Gore

10. Calder v. Bull

11. Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defence Council Inc.

12. Chisholm v. Georgia

13. City of Boerne v. Flores

14. Cooper v. Aaron

15. Corfield v. Coryell

16. District of Columbia v. Heller

17. Dred Scott v. Sandford

18. Employment Div. Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith

19. Engel v. Vitale

20. Fletcher v. Peck

21. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority

22. Gibbons v. Ogden

23. Gregory v. Ashcroft

24. Griswold v. Connecticut

25. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld

26. Katzenbach v. Morgan

27. Kennedy v. Louisiana

28. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents

29. Lochner v. New York

30. Marbury v. Madison

31. M’Culloch v. State

32. National League of Cities v. Usery

33. Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs

34. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer

35. New York v. U.S.

36. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.1

37. Plessy v. Ferguson

38. Poe v. Ullman

39. Printz v. U.S.

40. R.A.V. v. City of St.Paul, Minn.

41. Romer v. Evans

42. Slaughter-House Cases

43. U.S. v. Carolene Products Co.

44. U.S. v. Guest

45. U.S. v. Morrison

46. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette

47. Whitney v. California

Arver v. U.S.

US Constitutional Law

Arver v. U.S.
‘On the Wire’ by Harvey Thomas Dunn

In a suit concerning the alleged servitude of previously disparate citizens, the meticulously prepared terms of the U.S. Constitution were construed to be no more than oppressive and unfair expectations of those living under their otherwise protective measures.

Art. I,  § 8, cl. 11 of the U.S. Constitution reads that Congress is empowered:

“To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water….”

And thus art. I, § 8, cl. 12 provides that Congress can:

“[R]aise and support armies….”

While art. I, § 8, cl. 18 further states that Congress has the power:

To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”

Those same constitutional powers are then supported by art. VI, cl. 2, which explains that:

“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”

However in times of crisis, the Federal Constitution also provides that Congress is granted power:

“To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”

Which denotes that while Congress was constitutionally free to raise armies by enlistment or compulsory draft, the actual construction of the U.S. militia was one left for individual States to arrange. 

Under the National Guard Act of 1903, those same militia use during the preceding civil wars were converted into the National Guard, while a further number were used to create the National Guard Reserve under the National Defense Act of 1916, both of which were then trained and organised by the individual States, thus when Congress enacted ‘An Act to authorize the President to increase temporarily the military establishment of the United States’  in 1917, a number of men argued that such legislation was violative of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which itself read that:

“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”

Despite which, all six of the defendants were convicted in the District Courts of both Minnesota and New York, before petitioning to the U.S. Supreme Court under writ of error, who duly reminded them of the above separation of powers under the Constitution, while also noting by way of example, that when referencing the definition of militia, art. 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 clearly explained:

“That every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property, and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion toward the expense of that protection, and yield his personal service when necessary, or an equivalent thereto.”

Therefore with little empathy for the petitioners’ complaints, the Court upheld the two district court judgments in full, while holding that:

“A default in exercising a duty may not be resorted to as a reason for denying its existence.”

U.S. v. Price

US Constitutional Law

U.S. v. Price
‘Murder in Mississippi’ by Norman Rockwell

In a controversial case involving assault and murder, the actions of both law enforcement officers and citizens of Neshoba County, Mississippi, amounted to the wanton execution of three unarmed African-Americans in the same year that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was born.

Having detained the men on grounds unestablished during the appeal, the now defendant Deputy Sheriff released them without charge in the early hours of a June morning, only to later pull their vehicle over on Highway 19, whereupon he removed them from the car and drove them in his own police vehicle, to an unpaved road located off the highway.

It was there that the respondent, along with another seventeen men, two of which included a Sheriff Rainey and Patrolman Willis of the Philadelphia, Mississippi Police Department collectively assaulted, shot and killed the men in cold blood, before removing their bodies to a dam construction site located roughly five miles southwest of Philadelphia, Mississippi.

Upon indictment to the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, the defendants were charged with direct violations of 18 U.S.C. §§  241 and 242, which read that:

“(§ 241) If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same….They shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.”

(§ 242) Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State….to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States….by reason of his color, or race….shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both….and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section….shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.”

Along with allegations that the assaults were violative of the now-deceased victims’ rights to trial under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

With consideration of the limitations of constitutional statute, and the precedent that such protections were only enforceable between citizens and States, the court held the convictions unlawful and the charges were thus dismissed by a grand jury, after which the United States appealed to U.S. Supreme Court in the hope of greater clarity of judgment.

Tackling § 242 first, the Court noted that while the officers were clearly acting under ‘color of law’ in a literal sense, nothing altered the fact that the same term applied not only to those employed by the State, but to all civilians of the United States, therefore the Court upheld the charges while holding that:

“[T]hey were participants in official lawlessness, acting in wilful concert with State officers and hence under color of law.”

While in relation to § 241, the Court highlighted that in U.S. v. Williams, the Court had held § 241 as inapplicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, however the overall decision came not from uniform judicial agreement, but a single ruling of res judicata, which left the issue of applicability unanswered until now.

It was at this point that the Court held instead, how:

“s 241 must be read as it is written-to reach conspiracies to injure any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States; that this language includes rights or privileges protected by the Fourteenth Amendment….”

While adding that:

“[T]he State, without the semblance of due process of law as required of it by the Fourteenth Amendment, used its sovereign power and office to release the victims from jail so that they were not charged and tried as required by law, but instead could be intercepted and killed. If the Fourteenth Amendment forbids denial of counsel, it clearly denounces denial of any trial at all.”

After which the Court promptly reversed and remanded the case back to the district court, while reminding the parties that:

“[A] decision interpreting a federal law in accordance with its historical design, to punish denials by State action of constitutional rights of the person can hardly be regarded as adversely affecting the wise adjustment between State responsibility and national control…”

 

The civil procedure section is now complete.

United States Law: A Case study Collection

United States
‘United States Flags Map’ by Inspirowl Design

April 18 2018

Having recently completed this preliminary chapter of the book, I have provided a list of the cases covered in the civil procedure section for those that might be mildly curious. I would also add that it’s been a genuine pleasure reading and analysing these cases, all of which have helped educate me as to the intricate nature of State and Federal legalities, and I can only hope the readers will take as much pleasure in their reading, as I have in their writing.

Civil Procedure

1. Adam v. Saenger

2. Aldinger v. Howard

3. Asahi Metal Industry Co. Ltd. v. Superior Court of California

4. Ashcroft v. Iqbal

5. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n

6. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly

7. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’n

8. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America

9. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation

10. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz

11. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin

12. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Co-op. Inc.

13. Carnival Cruise Lines Inc. v. Shute

14. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett

15. Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank

16. Clearfield Trust Co. v. U.S.

17. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.

18. Colgrove v. Battin

19. Conley v. Gibson

20. Connecticut v. Doehr

21. D.H. Overmeyer Co. Inc. of Ohio v. Frick Co.

22. Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co.

23. Durfee v. Duke

24. Erie. R. Co. v. Tompkins

25. Fuentes v. Shevin

26. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities Inc.

27. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.

28. Grable and Sons Metal Products Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg.

29. Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York

30. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert

31. Hanna v. Plumer

32. Hanson v. Denckla

33. Harris v. Balk

34. Henry L. Doherty and Co. v. Goodman

35. Hess v. Pawlowski

36. Hickman v. Taylor

37. Hilton v. Guyot

38. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.

39. Hurn v. Oursler

40. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington

41. J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro

42. Kalb v. Feuerstein

43. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.

44. Kulko v. Superior Court of California

45. Livingston v. Jefferson

46. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley

47. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.

48. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson

49. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.

50. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange

51. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.

52. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.

53. National Equipment Rental Limited v. Szukhent

54. North Georgia Finishing Inc. v. Di-Chem Inc.

55. Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.

56. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger

57. Parklane Hosiery Co. Inc. v. Shore

58. Pennoyer v. Neff

59. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.

60. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts

61. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno

62. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.

63. Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.

64. Shaffer v. Heitner

65. Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter

66. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.

67. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.

68. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View

69. Swift v. Tyson

70. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs

71. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.

72. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson

73. Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com Inc.

Baender v. Barnett

US Criminal Law

Baender v. Bennett
‘Five Dollar Gold Coin’ by Toby Mikle

Confession to a crime under federal statute leads to the incarceration of a felon, who later cites a constitutional violation when revoking his awareness of the act imprisoned for.

Having been found in possession of counterfeit coin dies, the petitioner acquiesced to the charge and was summarily indicted and sentenced under 18 U.S.C.A. § 487, which reads:

“Whoever, without lawful authority, possesses any such die, hub, or mold, or any part thereof, or permits the same to be used for or in aid of the counterfeiting of any such coins of the United States shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or both.”

Later claiming a violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the petitioner argued that the statute failed to acknowledge whether a charge of possession was established through conscious knowledge or by accidental means, a contention dismissed by the District Court of Northern California, who concluded:

“Such is the possession intended by the indictment, and such is the possession, the petitioner having pleaded guilty to the indictment, that he must be held to have had. Otherwise he was not guilty. He might have pleaded not guilty, and upon trial shown that he did not know the dies were in his possession.”

Appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court under writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner again cited that the statute was incriminating by effect, however, the Court referred to United States v. Kirby, in which it had stressed that:

“All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the Legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this character.”

While again in United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, the Court had later explained how:

“A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid, not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.”

Thus it was for these reasons that the Court held the previous decision as lawful, while reminding the petitioner that although the U.S. Constitution is designed to safeguard the needs and rights of its citizens, there was equal importance for Congress to enforce the punishment of those found possessing the means with which to duplicate, and thereby counterfeit, U.S. currency in all its forms.

Brandenburg v. Ohio

US Constitutional Law

Brandenburg v Ohio
Image: ‘Freedom of Speech’ by Norman Rockwell

Freedom of speech and the right to incite action form the bedrock of the U.S. Constitution, however when threatened through state laws, the courts must preserve those liberties, even when used for immoral purposes. On this occasion, the propagation of racist and discriminatory rhetoric through a popular medium led to the conviction of a contributor, whereupon the defendant argued for his right to dissent.

In 1969, the now appellant was indicted and sentenced to a fine and imprisonment, after recorded television footage showed him partaking in a Klu Klux Klan rally designed to disseminate their plans for governmental challenge on grounds of perceived racial subjugation by Congress.

Under the terms of s.2923.13 of the Ohio Revised Code, and the now defunct Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute 1919, the appellant was charged with:

“Advocating the duty, necessity, propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform”

And:

“Voluntarily assembly with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.”

Whereupon the appellant argued that such charges were in violation of the First and Fourteenth amendments to the Constitution, both of which read:

“(1) Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

(14)(1) All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

Despite this inherent defence, the court unwaveringly held the conviction, after which the appellant sought the opinion of the Intermediate Appeal Court of Ohio, who again dismissed his contention outright. With presentation before the U.S. Supreme Court, the matter was naturally given greater consideration.

Having examined the footage and accompanying commentary, it was agreed that there was little to support the application of the 1919 statute when with consideration of the context in which the recording was made, there was insufficient evidence to suggest open advocation of violence, despite the presence of firearms and racially provocative speech amidst the poor quality of sound available.

It was this caveat which then drew early reference to cases such as De Jonge v. Oregon, in which the Court had held how:

“The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental”

That in turn led the Court to consider the relevance of the ‘clear and present danger’ test, as established in Schenck v. United States, where Justice Holmes explained that:

“The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”

And Abrams v. United States, where he again remarked:

It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in 1832 setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned. Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the mind of the country.”

Both of which remained a judicial truism until Gitlow v. People of State of New York, where he concluded how:

“Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker’s enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason….If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.”

Thus showing renewed appreciation of the constitutional rights afforded all American citizens, even when the premise of such speech stems from divisive and unconstitutional rationales. It was for this reason that the Court uniformly held that the fundamental right to assert ones opinions, regardless of who may or may not be offended, must be safeguarded on the principle that anything less would be an invasion of liberty and a dismantling of the only platform upon which to express civil discontent.