BLACK AND MORGAN v WILKINSON

Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and the right to manifest one’s religious beliefs, lock horns in a case built around progressive lifestyles and the security of dogma.

Having established herself as the owner operator of a bed and breakfast, the appellant consciously took bookings on principles espoused through Christian teachings, one of which precluded the use of double rooms by those outside wedlock.

While considered a practical and measured restriction, the appellant was often found letting out such rooms to unmarried couples, largely due to the difficulty in establishing their marital status at the time of agreement.

However, the footing of this matter rested upon a homosexual couple, who having secured the room via email, and duly paying the required deposit, arrived at the property, before finding themselves denied use of the double room on grounds of their sexual relationship and unmarried status (an impossible task at the time of this hearing).

At the point of litigation, the claimants argued that the appellant had unlawfully discriminated against them under the terms of the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations Act 2007 (SI 2007/1263), in particular regulations 3 and 4, which read:

“3.(1) For the purposes of these Regulations, a person (“A”) discriminates against another (“B”) if, on grounds of the sexual orientation of B or any other person except A, A treats B less favourably than he treats or would treat others (in cases where there is no material difference in the relevant circumstances).

4. (1) It is unlawful for a person (“A”) concerned with the provision to the public or a section of the public of goods, facilities or services to discriminate against a person (“B”) who seeks to obtain or to use those goods, facilities or services”

Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations Act 2007

While the appellant countered that she had refused the claimants use of the room under regulation 6, which reads:

“6.-(1) Regulation 4 does not apply to anything done by a person as a participant in arrangements under which he (for reward or not) takes into his home, and treats as if they were members of his family, children, elderly persons, or persons requiring a special degree of care and attention.”

Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations Act 2007

Further arguing that her business fell outside the scope of a boarding house, as expressed in regulation 4(2)(b) of the same statutory instrument.

During the first hearing, the court refused to uphold her claim and found her liable for sexual discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, whereupon the defendant argued her case in the Court of Appeal.

Here, the facts were given greater consideration, including various articles of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). With regard to exemption from regulation 4(b), the Court observed that in Otter v Norman the House of Lords had ruled that:

“[T]he provision of breakfast by itself, with the implicit inclusion of the ancillary services involved in preparing it and the provision of crockery and cutlery with which to eat it, amounted to “board” within the meaning of section 7(1) [of the Rent Act 1977].”

OTTER v NORMAN

However, with careful observation of regulation 6(1), it was noted by the Court that the claimants were anything but members of her family, children, elderly persons of those requiring special degree of care and attention.

The appellant also relied upon Preddy v Bull for her contention that her refusal of the respondents occupation was one based upon an objection to sexual behaviour, and not orientation; yet, the parties involved were in a civil partnership, which distinguished it from the immediate case.

Turning instead to proportionality for justification, the appellant relied upon articles 8 (Right to respect and private family life) and 9 (Freedom of thought, conscience and religion) of the ECHR for her right to exclusion, while the respondents relied upon articles 8 and 14 (Prohibition of discrimination) to uphold their right to occupation.

It was then noted that while article 9(1) provides for religious manifestation, article 9(2) also provides that restrictions apply when preserving the rights of others, which on this occasion worked against the appellant, as she was by all accounts, running a commercial enterprise, and which under a Government paper titled “Getting Equal: Proposals to outlaw sexual orientation discrimination in the provision of goods and services, Government Response to Consultation” it was outlined on page 13 that:

“The Government contends that where businesses are open to the public on a commercial basis, they have to accept the public as it is constituted.”

While it was also stressed in Eweida and others v United Kingdom that:

“Even where the belief in question attains the required level of cogency and importance, it cannot be said that every act which is in some way inspired, motivated or influenced by it constitutes a ‘manifestation’ of the belief.”

EWEIDA AND OTHERS v United Kingdom

And so despite any freedom to manifest one’s religious beliefs when operating a licensed business to paying customers, indirect discrimination through the application of a policy denying equal rights to those in homosexual relationships amounted to a uniform ruling of direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, while the appeal court held that:

“[D]irect discrimination cannot be justified, whereas indirect discrimination can be justified if it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.”

RE DENNING

The formalities of a last will and testament are brought to bear when upon their death, the testator had left a declaration of intent, but with two named individuals on the reverse and nothing to connect them.

In accordance with the rules of probate, the alleged beneficiaries applied for a grant of letters of administration on the strength that the deceased had orally expressed her intention to bequeath all her possessions to two cousins; upon which, she had written on a small sheet of plain paper, words echoing that sentiment, yet with only ‘signed’ at the foot of the document.

Written on the reverse, and while upside down, were the two names of women who had since become untraceable; and so, keen to endorse the aims of the testator, the judge explained that perhaps the time was right for the application of the maxim omnia praesumunter rite esse acta meaning ‘all things are to be done in due form.’

It was further commented that at that time, the court felt it had extended its willingness to uphold the wishes of a testator to its fullest; however, the judge felt that despite the presence of an attestation clause in Peverett, there was little to connect the names of the two women to the express desires of the deceased.

Despite this, and in keeping with the powers of a court to declare that which was clearly felt at the time of writing the will, the judge took the decision to further extend the boundaries, as there was no credible reason why the two signatures were entered on the reverse other than to attest and support the wishes of another, while reminding the parties that in In the Goods of Peverett it was held that:

“[T]he court will not allow a matter of form to stand in the way if the essential elements of execution have been fulfilled”.

TRESPASS

To clarify, there are two types of trespass, namely trespass to the person and trespass to land; and so here we will begin by looking at trespass to the person.

Trespass to the person
Trespass to the person includes three torts, ranging from (i) battery (ii) assault and (iii) false imprisonment, as first truly defined by Goff LJ in Collins v Warlock when he said:

“An assault is an act which causes another person to apprehend the infliction of immediate, unlawful, force on his person; a battery is the actual infliction of unlawful force on another person. Both assault and battery are forms of trespass to the person. Another form of trespass to the person is false imprisonment, which is the unlawful imposition of constraint upon another’s freedom of movement from a particular place.”

Collins v Warlock

(i) Battery
While claiming accidental causes, the defendant in Williams v Humphrey was found liable for battery after pushing the victim into a swimming pool, whereupon the claimant broke his ankle. Given that the intention to push the victim was present, no argument to the contrary could reasonably stand and so damages were awarded.

(ii) Assault
In R v Ireland, a number of women subjected to continuous psychological damage through repeated abusive phone calls, were given the right to claim for assault, even though they never met the defendant in person. When reaching summary judgment, it was remarked by Hope LJ that:

“If the words or gestures are accompanied in their turn by gestures or by words which threaten immediate and unlawful violence, that will be sufficient for an assault. The words or gestures must be seen in their whole context.”

R v Ireland

(iii) False Imprisonment
While reminiscent of physical imposition, this tortious facet involves the restriction of liberty and movement of an individual, while as many might expect, there are cases where over extension of a prison sentence will suffice, however mere isolation or deprivation of escape will also apply.

It is important to note that while the victim may only fear these actions yet not necessarily fall subject to their physical consequences, psychological harm, where proven, will suffice under a claim.

Unlike the tort of negligence, trespass to the person relies upon intention, actual harm and obvious effect, and so victims are compensated not for unintentional damage, but that caused with deliberation.

Trespass to land
Similarly, trespass to land addresses deliberate actions by those subject to it, while primary focus is placed upon the protection and preservation of land or property.

Harm is treated as one stemming from interference with a right to privacy and occupation, and so while possession of the land is imperative to a successful claim, there are (as with trespass to the person) four distinct categories of interference, namely (i) crossing a boundary, (i) remaining on land, (iii) exceeding permissions associated with land and (iv) placing objects upon land without express consent of the owner.

(i) Crossing boundaries
Undoubtedly the more common complaint is one of boundary violation (see Entick v Carrington), and while often focussed upon overgrown foliage or other such matters, there are also incidents where property intrudes into the airspace of land.

As an example, in Anchor Brewhouse Developments Ltd v Berkley House (Dockland Developments) Ltd where a contractor’s crane overswung into a neighbouring property, thus prompting a supported claim for trespass through ‘airspace’.

(ii) Remaining on land
In Jones v Persons Unknown, the freeholders of unregistered land were forced to serve eviction notices after a group of ‘fracking’ protestors set up residence and refused to leave. While claiming to be protecting the land on which they had become entrenched, the defendants were ultimately evicted under the award of a possession order on grounds of trespass.

When outlying the justification for the order, the judge remarked:

“[T]here is simply no evidence that they gave any relevant consent to the occupation of their land which would preclude the claimants from seeking to recover it back…he was in unlawful possession of the claimants’ land, and thus amenable to a claim in trespass and the costs associated with such a claim. It would be to allow him, and others in a similar position, effectively to get away with acts of trespass if they were not required to pay the costs of consequent legal proceedings.”

Jones v Persons Unknown

(iii) Exceeding permissions (trespass ab initio)
When a party enters owned land under agreement, but then proceeds to potentially outstay that welcome through unlawful or abusive actions, the owner is entitled to claim trespass from the point at which the visitor caused offence.

In a case called The Six Carpenters, a number of carpenters entered an inn before ordering and paying for wine and bread; however, things took a turn for the worse when after ordering more wine they refused to pay for it; thus instigating a unsuccessful claim for trespass damages by the landlord when the court held:

“[F]or not paying for the wine, the defendants shall not be trespassers, for the denying to pay for it is no trespass, and therefore they cannot be trespassers ab initio…”

The Six Carpenters

(iv) Placing objects
In Arthur v Anker, the deliberate placement of an oil tanker and flower pots along a boundary wall caused tensions between neighbours, until a claim for trespass led to an injunction to remove the objects, despite several months between their placement and the litigation.

In surmising the judgment, Aldous J emphasised that:

“[T]here is no evidence that such inaction in respect of the oil tank, or any inaction in respect of the flower pots, caused Mr. Stones to believe that he could maintain the tank on the wall situated as it is…He placed the tank upon the wall himself and in my view it could not be seriously suggested that there was detriment in not objecting immediately and now requiring him to remove it.”

Arthur v Anker

BLACKWELL v BLACKWELL

Verbal instructions that are then attested and complied with by the named trustees before the death of a testator, fall neatly between the rules of wills and probate and the equitable field of trust law.

On this occasion, the wish of a dying man was such that a large sum of money was to be held upon trust for a party outside of his marriage while unknown to his widow.

Having long agonised over his duty to make provisions for a mother and a child borne out of wedlock, it was decided by the testator to set aside several thousand pounds in the wish that five of his closest friends would act as trustees with the express purpose of investing the funds for the benefit of the two named parties, until such time that the trustees elected to provide them with two thirds of the initial sum, before placing the remaining third back into the residuary estate of his final will.

Upon his death, his widow discovered the bequest, and looked to dismiss its validity upon grounds of fraud and contradiction to the terms of the will where his widow and their son were to benefit from his entire estate.

As was common to domestic legislation, section 9 of the Wills Act 1837 read that no will (or codicil) shall be valid unless set in writing and signed by the testator in accordance with statute.

On this occasion, the instructions given by the deceased were initially verbal, and only put to writing by means of a memorandum drafted by his solicitor, who himself signed as a trustee and submitted it in support of the codicil.

Using the terms contained within the 1837 Act, it was argued that while the trust memorandum was written, the execution of the codicil was oral, and therefore fell outside the powers granted beneficiaries, unless it was in effect, designed to stand for the sole benefit of the widow through the residual estate; in which case the trustees would be acting in fraud should they look to enforce the terms of the codicil.

While decided twice in favour of the trustees, it was later put before the House of Lords, where the rules of equity were scrutinised in conjunction with proven case law.

Having examined the principle that equity will not permit statute to be used as a cloak for fraud, it was found that where a testator propounds a desire to execute a trust, and then proceeds to provide explicit instruction as to its use, any argument that seeks to undermine the intentions of that person through the use of legislation, must then find themselves party to fraud if they would instead stand to benefit from the funds expressly requested for the enjoyment of another.

In circumstances such as these, it was historically preferred that equity imputes the same responsibility as that agreed to by the original trustee, so that they would then act under the same instructions so as to permit the objective of the deceased to be realised, while this transference effectively circumvents the fraud and makes right, that which is prima facie claimed wrong.

Resting upon this proven application of jurisprudence, the presiding Lords established that far from looking to dissect the flaws proposed by the appellants, it was clear that any conflict arising from a lack of signatory validation, was insufficient when looking to overrule the will of the testator against a trust that by all accounts, left no illusions as to its purpose and means of delivery, and so awarded for the trustees while holding that:

“[V]erbal or written instructions communicated by a testator to a legatee and assented to by him create an enforceable trust…”

MILROY v LORD

When a man of standing sought to create a trust for the purposes of a relative’s benefit, he was careful enough to provide specific instructions to his trustee, but unfortunately erred in putting them into action.

A number of years after his death, the beneficiary challenged the assigned executor on grounds that his written desire for her to gain lawful receipt was sufficient enough to constitute an enforceable covenant and that the courts were inter alia wrong to deny it.

In 1852, the settlor drafted a deed-poll that enabled fifty shares of his stock held in the Louisiana Bank to be transferred to his associate (who had become his appointed trustee) on the proviso that under a number of specific conditions he was to hold the shares upon trust for the benefit of his beloved niece.

He also stipulated that during the time between his grant and the date of her marriage or his death, the trustee was to manage the trust and pay any profits arising from the dividend interest to the beneficiary.

During this period, the settlor also granted the trustee power of attorney over all of his financial matters, and so while it was possible for the trustee to complete the request, he never managed to fully execute transferral under the banking practice policy, which required the participation of either the settlor himself or a qualified solicitor, and where neither was found, that the power of attorney rested not with the trustee but the bank.

In the first instance, the presiding judge awarded that by virtue of the deed construction, a valid trust had existed, and that the fifty shares were to be reissued by the executor to the existing trustee, where they would be again held upon trust for the niece (as had been the case before the settlor’s death).

However, under appeal the Court took the equitable view that a legally incomplete gesture cannot be enforced as equity will not perfect an imperfect gift‘, and so held that it was impossible for the settlor to become a self-appointed trustee for the shares discussed.

Rather, it was declared that the funds were to be held upon trust by the executor until amendments could be made to the deed that provided for redistribution in the manner first intended, or until the trustee and beneficiary chose to take individual action against him, while the court reminded both parties that:

“[I]n order to render a voluntary settlement valid and effectual, the settler must have done everything which, according to the nature of the property comprised in the settlement, was necessary to be done in order to transfer the property and render the settlement binding upon him.”

ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR HONG KONG v REID

The phrase ‘two wrongs do not make a right’ is virtuous to the truth that misdeeds can never amount to anything more than loss, yet when adopted for equitable purposes, the exact opposite can be found.

After rising through the ranks of Hong Kong administration, a solicitor turned Director of Public Prosecutions positioned himself to where he was able to accept sporadic bribes in exchange for his obstruction of justice through the failed convictions of known criminals.

Having taken over HK $12m in payments, the respondent in this matter invested the funds into three properties, two of which were in title to himself and his wife and the third to his solicitor.

The discovery of his fraudulent behaviour and subsequent criminal prosecution raised the question of whether by his breach of fiduciary duty as a servant of the Crown, the sums paid were now held upon constructive trust for his former employers, and that any monetary gain following the purchase of the homes was composite to that trust.

Common law principles surrounding fiduciary breach and profit from such breaches have been long held to apply in favour of the trust beneficiary, despite the illegality on the part of the fiduciary when in receipt of bribes from third parties.

This is because when acting beyond the remit of the trustee, and in a manner that is dishonest, the action itself becomes legitimate, if only for the benefit of those the fiduciary/trustee was appointed to serve.

This translates that although the respondent allowed himself to selfishly receive bribes in exchange for personal profit, equity would ascribe that his deceit was immediately converted into a positive gesture conferring direct gain to his employers, as no fiduciary can be seen to profit from his breach as previously mentioned.

This, by virtue of the fact of those principles, altered the manner in which the respondent not only executed his plans, but provided the Crown with privilege to acquire beneficial interest in the properties purchased, along with any increase their value since initial conveyance.

When considered by the Privy Council, it was quickly agreed that any conditions imputed by the respondents upon the entitlement of his employers to seek recovery of the debts through the homes, failed to override the fundamental obligations owed to him while serving and acting under fiduciary capacity, despite any notion of separateness or mixed investment on his part; and so dismissed his appeal, while holding that:

“[A] fiduciary acting dishonestly and criminally who accepts a bribe and thereby causes loss and damage to his principal must also be a constructive trustee and must not be allowed by any means to make any profit from his wrongdoing.”

ASSOCIATED PROVINCIAL PICTURE HOUSES v WEDNESBURY CORP.

Acting ultra vires through the application of executive powers is not something alien to public authority decision-making, but it is equally important that those seeking legal review are clear as to exactly what has constituted a breach of their jurisdiction.

During the period following the second world war, there were three Acts that affected the opening times of cinematograph houses across the UK.

The first was the Cinematograph Act 1909, the second was the Sunday Entertainments Act 1932, and third was Defence Regulation 42B, which was introduced during the war, but remained effective until late 1947.

When it was decided by an issuing local authority to grant a trading licence to their local picture house, there came with it restrictions preventing any attendance by children aged below fifteen years of age, regardless of whether they were accompanied by an adult.

While appreciative of the opportunity to open on a day typically reserved for domestic pursuits, the appellants sought judicial review on grounds that such a restriction was self-defeating and thereby ‘unreasonable’.

As there were three Acts from which to rely upon, it was agreed that for the purposes of clarity the Sunday Entertainments Act was the most appropriate, and yet within the terms prescribed, section 1(1) provided that the issue of a licence was “subject to such conditions as the authority think fit to impose.” This, it was agreed, allowed the local authority to apply its discretion to the limitations of the permit, and so by extension, it had acted accordingly.

When heard in the first instance, the court dismissed the objections brought by the picture house, and after a brief but considered review of that decision, it was reiterated that while the courts are able to question the legal validity of executive decisions, they are not equipped nor predisposed, to challenge the illegitimacy of those limitations, unless the body in question has applied it powers outside the boundaries of reasonableness, and in ignorance of required objectives.

Relying upon the relevant case history behind these matters, there was (despite strong opposition by the commercial vendors) no precedent upon which their argument could stand; and so, the court noted that it was important to hold in mind the scope of discretion afforded local authorities when following statute before taking legal action, while further reminding the parties that:

“[T]he court, whenever it is alleged that the local authority have contravened the law, must not substitute itself for that authority.”

R v SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRANSPORT EX PARTE FACTORTAME NO.2

Direct effect compatibility and the transposition obligations owed by Member States was a ruling that would soon unearth conflicts of interest.

On this occasion, the contention was brought about by aggressive amendment to statute in favour of the UK fishing industry.

Until 1988, those parties involved in domestic commercial fishing were required to register under the Merchant Shipping Act 1894; an Act that allowed overseas companies to operate outside British waters, but still have their fleets registered under UK incorporation.

As a means of preventing ‘quota hopping’ (over-fishing), it was enacted by Parliament to include Part II of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 and Merchant Shipping (Registration of Fishing Vessels) Regulations 1988, to the effect that all those trading were to re-register under new conditions.

These terms required that in order to qualify for registration, the company must have a minimum of seventy-five percent British ownership, and where ownership fell outside the United Kingdom, there needed to be a seventy-five percent share hold by British citizens.

This translated that the appellants, who had been previously registered for over almost twenty years, were now unable to re-register, as the owners were Spanish and therefore exempt from the new legislation.

Having appreciated the United Kingdom’s position as a Member State, and subsequent membership to EU Community law, the firm sought proceedings under the principle that the choice taken to exclude other EU members from registration had displayed an overt refusal to comply with article 177 of the EEC Treaty.

Furthermore, it was claimed that where Community rights were held to have ‘direct effect’, it was the onus of the national courts to suspend challenged legislation, with the granting of interim relief where proven necessary.

When heard in the Divisional Courts, the claim was supported and provisions made to allow the unfettered trading of the claimants, until such time that clarification was found in the challenge against the amended Act.

However, when appealed by the Secretary of State, Court of Appeal Court set aside the previous finding, while granting leave of appeal to the House of Lords.

In this instance, the House agreed that should the claimants’ fail in their argument, the financial damage would be sufficient enough to cause irretrievable damage to the firm, but that without a preliminary ruling by the European Court of Justice (COJ), it was impossible to determine if the courts were empowered to suspend legislative effect, and how best to determine what form the interim relief should take.

Upon deliberate consideration by the COJ, it was unanimously agreed that when the objectives of direct effect were designed, they were done so in a way that intended literal application with immediate purpose, and that unless under exceptional circumstances, it was the duty of the national courts to hold the powers of Community law above those of domestic interest, whereupon the House held that:

“[N]ational courts are required to afford complete and effective judicial protection to individuals on whom enforceable rights are conferred under a directly effective Community provision, on condition that the Community provision governs the matter in question from the moment of its entry into force…”

GILLETT v HOLT

The notorious ambiguity of estoppel is explored here through the unexpected end of a lifelong working relationship built upon trust, duty and a faith of spirit, and as is so often found in matters such as these, a man’s word is not always his bond.

After investing the best part of forty years into a farming alliance that created an almost familial structure, the arrival of a divisive party witnessed the destructive end of a mutually prosperous and seemingly concrete friendship.

When a younger man forged a meaningful relationship with an older farmer, the two men became almost father and son, with the former relying upon, and often following the wisdom of the latter, in accordance with domestic arrangements, career aspirations and even parenting decisions; all while sustaining and enriching the estate’s financial footing through the course of his duties.

This interdependence became the foundation of a commercial enterprise that by definition became more complex; and so, required increased investment from both the employer’s paid advisers and the younger man’s wife as a co-contributor.

During the many years spent together, there had been a significant number of verbal declarations as to the intentions of the elder man when it came time to choose a successor to his sprawling estates, and it was these quasi-promises, along with multiple wills, that coloured the appellant’s choice-making and calculated reluctance to set aside the type of financial provisions one might ordinarily expect.

The mechanics of the business and associated friendship continued to flourish, until the arrival of a trained solicitor, who for one reason of another, began making spurious claims that the appellant and his wife were defrauding the business, and that legal intervention was ultimately necessary.

This course of action and influential advice also led to the couple’s removal from the existing will, whereupon sole beneficial rights instead passed to the now co-defendant.

After an exhaustive cross-examination in the original hearing, the deciding judge awarded against the appellant, despite his claim of proprietary estoppel following the removal of his presence in the will, and inherent reliance upon the goodwill of the defendant during the passage of time.

At appeal, the fluid and therefore often misinterpreted principle of estoppel, was held to close scrutiny, along with the previous findings of the judge; whereupon it became clear that while a degree of effort had been put into the relevance of estoppel, the obvious right to claim had been lost to principles attributable to succession law.

Through the delicate use of equity, the Court then agreed that there was ample evidence to show a detriment under continued reliance, and that in order for a clean break to exist, there needed to be a reversal of fortune on the part of the co-defendant, and a ‘coming good’ on the word of the older man, while the court reminded the parties that:

“[A]ssurance is more than a mere statement of present (revocable) intention, and is tantamount to a promise.”

AHMAD v UNITED KINGDOM

While paving the way for a number of similar ‘religious obligations’ versus ‘convention rights’ cases, this protracted legal discourse reveals a number of indiscretions, that in many respects, served to influence legislative and educational policy in the United Kingdom, and illustrate how laws evolve through the integration of cultural norms and progressive state cohabitation.

After working as a supply teacher within the mainstream schools arena for a considerable number of years, the Islamic applicant took issue with the government, upon grounds that his need (or at least doctrinal requirement) to attend a mosque on Friday afternoons was being denied by statute; and that subsequent operational policy created the violation of a number of constitutional rights afforded to all citizens of the United Kingdom.

Citing article 9(1) of the ECHR (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and article 14 (prohibition of discrimination), the applicant protested that section 30 of the Education Act 1994 stood in immediate conflict with his need to manifest his religious beliefs every Friday between the hours of 1.30pm to 2.15pm.

Having been employed by a number of London Borough schools prior to his decision to resign rather than reduce his working hours, the applicant had been given verbal allowances by one school, and shown strict opposition by another, which bore an inconsistent position of unwillingness to accommodate a religious need, which until recently, had never been expressed nor discussed at the time of his original appointment.

When it was submitted that the repeated failure of a Muslim man to attend a mosque (subject to relative distances) would likely result in a beheading in a country such as Saudi Arabia, the applicant expected that the same principles would apply under  domestic jurisdiction, and that those grounds, along with previous (albeit unofficial) allowances were sufficient enough to warrant time taken from his contractual duties, despite any inconvenience to teaching  staff, pupils or the school as a whole.

After failing to find those arguments upheld in the domestic courts, the matter wound up before the European Commission for Human Rights, where it was unanimously decided that the terms of the Convention were constructed in such as fashion as to allow interpretation and consideration of all religions and beliefs, not just those of the applicant.

However, when willingly accepting a position of employment that brings with it a set of express and implied terms, the accepting individual takes ownership of how that agreement might impinge upon their religious requirements or obligations of faith, and must therefore act accordingly; hence, the Commission dismissed the application, while holding that:

“[E]ven a person at liberty may, in the exercise of his freedom to manifest his religion, have to take into account his particular professional or contractual position.”

Book your Free Consultation